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This thesis studies wage formation processes in the context of a globalizing 
economy and different institutional settings. Wage formation is highly relevant 
for employees, firms, policy makers and scientists alike, and therefore constitutes 
an important area for economic research. Globalization and other changes in 
the economic environment, such as technological progress and the deregulation 
of product markets, have also affected the conditions for wage formation. For 
instance, there are widespread concerns that globalization and international 
economic integration results in wage losses and increases inequality. Globalization 
may increase aggregate output, but also affect the distribution of income between 
firms and workers and different groups in the labor market unequally. Collective 
labor representation can mitigate or aggravate the effects for employers and 
employees. Moreover, increasing international and national competition together 
with technological progress can affect unionization and the coverage of collective 
wage contracts.
Against this background, this thesis addresses three main questions: First, 
how does collective bargaining coverage evolve in modern economies if firms 
are free to opt for alternative modes of wage-setting? Second, how does the 
increasing international exposure of firms affect wages in the context of different 
institutional settings? Third, how do wages and competitiveness affect the export 
participation of firms?
The immanent complexity of the subject does not allow for a unified answer, 
although all these topics are closely related. Consequently, each chapter of this 
thesis contains an independent analysis addressing different aspects, using a 
variety of economic and econometric methods.
The starting point for the analysis is presented in Chapter 2 by studying 
endogenous selection into wage regimes based on differences in cost structures. 
The choice between different wage regimes is essential to understand how wages 
are determined in modern economies and how different modes of wage-setting 
evolve over time in an environment with technological progress and increasing 
product market competition. The analysis is motivated by two seemingly 
contradicting observations: On the one hand, it is widely believed that firms 
oppose unions because they reduce profits. On the other hand, in most European 
countries, collective bargaining is at the discretion of the employer. The aim of 
the chapter is therefore to contribute to a better understanding of why firms 
might prefer collective bargaining over other modes of wage setting. The analysis 
is carried out in a theoretical general equilibrium framework with endogenous 
selection of wage regimes, where firms are free to choose to bargain with a local 
union or to refrain from it. Selection is driven by differences in the cost structure 
between wage regimes. It is shown that cost differences are sufficient to explain 
Introduction
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incomplete collective bargaining coverage rates as an equilibrium outcome. 
Furthermore, the results show that the decrease in collective bargaining coverage 
rates can be attributed to technological progress and product market deregulation.
Chapter 3 investigates wage formation in international firms subject to 
collective agreements. The growing inequality over the last decades in many 
Western countries has been attributed to technological change, institutional 
reforms and globalization. Previous research has shown that the rise in wage 
inequality can be attributed to higher wages at exporting firms, the so called 
exporter wage premium. In this context, recent theoretical contributions have 
emphasized that more trade exposure can influence the wage structure by 
reducing the exporter wage premium in firms subject to collective bargaining 
(e.g. Egger and Etzel, 2012). We test this hypothesis by employing German linked 
employer–employee data. One important challenge is to separate the effects from 
differences in the workforce structure and rent-sharing. We construct a measure of 
plant-level profitability that is free from compositional effects. We find that rent-
sharing is less distinct in more export-intensive firms or more open industries. This 
chapter is joint work together with Gabriel Felbermayr (Ifo Institute Munich) and 
Hans-Jörg Schmerer (IAB Nuremberg) and has been published in the Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics.1
Chapter 4 addresses another aspect of wage formation in exporting firms. 
Again, the point of departure is the exporter wage premium, referring to the 
empirical observation that exporting firms pay systematically higher wages. It 
is also well documented that this wage premium decreases substantially once 
worker and firm characteristics are accounted for. However, the identification is 
based on the within variation of the data and might yield imprecise estimates if the 
variation over time is low. Recent contributions provide theoretical explanations 
for the exporter wage premium: Egger, Egger, and Kreickemeier (2011) base their 
rent-sharing mechanism on a fair-wage framework. Fair-wage considerations are, 
among other things, related to the firm’s “ability to pay”. Chapter 4 contributes to 
this literature by providing new empirical evidence for the fair-wage framework 
based on the system of industrial relations in Germany. The collectively agreed 
wage constitutes a legally binding wage floor. But firms are always allowed to 
pay more if they want to. The empirical analysis is based on the IAB establishment 
panel and employs different estimators addressing potential endogeneity and 
the truncation of the dependent variable from below. The results show that a 
firm’s export intensity is systematically related to payments above collectively 
1 See Felbermayr, Hauptmann, and Schmerer (2014). Previous versions of the paper have been circulated as 
Felbermayr, Hauptmann, and Schmerer (2012a) and Felbermayr, Hauptmann, and Schmerer (2012b).
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agreed wage floor and therefore support the fair-wage hypothesis. The chapter is 
co-authored by Hans-Jörg Schmerer (IAB Nuremberg) and has been published in 
Economics Letters.2
Chapter 5 addresses the link between wages and globalization from another 
perspective. German exports soared in the recent past, and this has been 
accompanied by a heated public debate. Adversaries object, that years of wage 
moderation increased international competitiveness and have allowed Germany 
to grow at the expense of its trading partners in the Eurozone. But beyond the 
debate on current account imbalances, an additional question arises, which 
has not received much attention in the literature. What are the determinants 
of a firm’s export participation? Chapter 5 studies this question empirically. It 
constructs plant- and industry-competitiveness measures to investigate their 
influence on export participation. The findings indicate that a higher plant-level 
competitiveness, measured by lower unit labor costs, is positively associated with 
export participation. The analysis is carried out for different estimators and margins 
of export participation. There is no evidence that industry-level competitiveness 
affects export participation. Furthermore, low-wage firms are less likely to export, 
which is in line with the literature on the export wage premium. The chapter 
is joint work together with Daniel Etzel (University Bayreuth) and Hans-Jörg 
Schmerer (IAB Nuremberg) and has been published in Economic Systems.3
Finally, Chapter 6 briefly concludes the main findings of the thesis.
2 See Hauptmann and Schmerer (2013).
3 See Etzel, Hauptmann, and Schmerer (2013).
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2.1 Introduction
It is commonly assumed that firms oppose unions because they reduce profits due to 
rent seeking behavior. Many economists see unions as monopolistic organizations 
that raise wages above the competitive level and create inefficiencies in resource 
allocations (Clark, 1984; Friedman, 2007).1 Others emphasize, beyond their role 
in wage-setting, beneficial aspects, such as the reduction of exits of employees, 
the raise in investments in firm-specific training (Freeman, 1976; Freeman and 
Medoff, 1984) and also welfare (Donado and Wälde, 2012). 
This chapter takes a different perspective on collective wage bargaining and 
unions. Union density has declined in many developed countries in the recent past. 
Nevertheless, collective bargaining is still an important, sometimes the dominating, 
mode of wage-setting. At the same time collective bargaining recognition is at 
the discretion of the employer, especially in many European countries. Why are 
collective agreements still so important today? What determines the collective 
bargaining coverage rate and why is it changing over time?
From an economic perspective there are two main explanations why firms 
would agree to collective wage bargaining.2 First, firms face a tradeoff between 
higher union wages and foregone revenues during strikes. Generally, the larger 
the impact of labor conflicts, the more likely the firm will agree to bargain 
with the union. Second, wage contracts are complex and may cover also more 
than wages. By dealing with one single entity, employers can realize gains form 
standardization and centralization. This transaction cost advantage has received 
almost no attention in the theoretical literature so far.
Against this background, this chapter analyses the role of transaction costs 
in the context of incomplete collective bargaining coverage and endogenous 
wage regime selection. The theoretical model draws on standard models of 
monopolistic competition and right-to-manage wage bargaining. Selection into 
regimes is driven by differences in cost structures associated with a particular 
wage regime. Firms are homogeneous after entering the market. Then, they decide 
whether to join one of two wage regimes. Wages are either bargained between 
the firm and a local (firm-level) union or they pay the market clearing wage rate 
in the non-unionized wage regime. When deciding about a wage regime, firms 
face an additional tradeoff: One wage regime is characterized by low fixed costs 
1 Inefficient collective bargaining outcomes are consistent with models of monopoly unions (Dunlop, 1944), right-
to-manage bargaining (Nickell and Andrews, 1983), and insider-outsider theories (Lindbeck and Snower, 1987). 
Other theories suggest that efficiency can be restored once wages and employment are bargained together 
(McDonald and Solow, 1981; Booth, 1995).
2 There are furthermore potential other historical, political, and regional motives, which are beyond the scope of 
this chapter.
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and high variable regime costs, whereas the opposite holds for the other regime.3 
The wage regime decision is not irrevocable. At every instant firms can enter 
or exit the market or switch the regime. The findings of this chapter indicate 
that the decrease in collective bargaining coverage rates over the last decades 
is consistent, for instance, with technological progress. It is also consistent with 
product market deregulation, emphasizing the interactions between labor and 
goods markets. Furthermore, allowing firms to decide over collective bargaining 
recognitions places a restriction on union actions. This gives rise to cooperation 
rather confrontation, which is a central feature of German systems of industrial 
relations.
The model presented in this chapter is related to several strands of literature. 
The first strand of literature consists of the few contributions which address 
incomplete union coverage and the choice between different wage bargaining 
regimes in one way or another. The model presented in Lazear (1983) complements 
the analysis carried out in this chapter by addressing the tradeoff between lower 
wages in the non-unionized regime and the cost of labor conflicts. Similar to 
the approach presented here, the decision problem considers cost differences. 
In Lazear (1983), competitive firms face a national union. If unionized, the firm 
pays a wage rate set by the union and hires workers conditioned on the union 
wage rate. If firms are not unionized, they pay the lower labor market clearing 
wage. Because the wage is higher in the unionized regime, other things equal, 
firms oppose unionization. However, fighting off a union and defending against 
a higher wage rate is costly to the firm and these costs are unequally distributed 
between firms. Therefore, firms with lower costs (or higher defense skills) will 
not be unionized up to a threshold level where paying the higher wage becomes 
cheaper compared to fighting. One of the main findings in Lazear (1983) is that a 
higher product demand elasticity decreases the likelihood of unionization, similar 
to the results presented here. However, in contrast to the present chapter, Lazear 
(1983) employs a framework with perfect competition instead of monopolistically 
competitive firms and assumes that a national union takes the effects of wages 
on employment and other aggregates into account.
Taschereau-Dumouchel (2014) presents a model tailored towards the US 
system of industrial relations. It addresses the bargaining regime decision from 
the worker perspective and analyses its impact on the firms’ labor demand 
decisions. The labor market is characterized by search frictions, generating rents 
3 During the description of the model and the subsequent analysis, we do not specify whether the unionized 
regime is the one with e.g. higher or lower fixed costs. The reason for this approach is that we do not want the 
conclusion to be buried in the assumptions. In fact we can show that an equilibrium exists in both scenarios, 
emphasizing that differences in cost structures are sufficient to generate simultaneous wage regimes with 
endogenous selection.
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for firms and job seekers once a worker has found a vacant position. Workers of 
different productivity vote about being collectively represented. If the majority 
favors unionization, wages are bargained collectively. Otherwise bargaining takes 
place individually between each worker and the firm.
Workers with a high productivity have a lower preference for union 
representation because the wage structure is more compressed. Firms oppose 
being unionized as it reduces their profits. It is shown that this distorts the hiring 
decision of the firms and that the distortion is even larger compared to a situation 
where being unionized is compulsory. Furthermore, it is emphasized that even if 
union density in the US is relatively low, the threat of being unionized can have a 
large economic impact.
Some of the more recent literature on incomplete unionization focuses on 
the impact of skill-biased technological change on unionization and income 
inequality. If collective bargaining compresses the wage structure – a stylized 
fact found in many studies4 – then skill-biased technological change raises the 
non-union wage opportunities of high-skilled relative to low-skilled workers 
and therefore reduces the preferences of high-skilled workers for collective 
representation (Acemoglu, Aghion, and Violante, 2001). Dinlersoz and Greenwood 
(2012) address this issue by using a dynamic general equilibrium model of costly 
unionization with high- and low-skilled workers.5 They find that skill-biased 
technological change can explain the decline of unionism and a rise in income 
inequality. This result is confirmed by Acikgöz and Kaymak (2014) building on a 
small firm search and matching model.
Another strand of literature treats the selection of wage bargaining regimes 
as given, but investigates incomplete unionization.6 Delacroix (2006) uses the 
large firm search and matching model with incomplete union coverage and 
different levels of coordination. He finds that unemployment increases with 
collective bargaining coverage and decreases with the degree of centralization 
or coordination. A similar theoretical approach is employed by Ebell and Haefke 
(2006). They study the effect of product market regulations on labor market 
outcomes and find that the decline of collective bargaining coverage rates in the 
4 The effect of unionization on the wage structure has been reported numerous times. Among others, see 
Freeman and Medoff (1984), Card (1996), and Card and DiNardo (2002) for the US and Dustmann, Ludsteck, and 
Schönberg (2009) for Germany.
5 Their analysis is based on the partial equilibrium of MacDonald and Robinson (1992), where a national union 
sets the wage rate of its members, their membership dues, and the number of firms covered. Since unionization 
is a costly endeavor, they find that incomplete union coverage arises from different fixed and variable costs 
components. Another, early contribution of costly unionization and incomplete coverage is presented in Kuhn 
(1988). He finds that unionized firms are likely larger and more productive.
6 Some of these contributions describe the conditions in which the agents would not want to switch their wage 
regime. But this can be considered as a different description of an endogenous selection equilibrium.
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US and the UK can be linked to the product market reforms of the 1980s. Jimeno 
and Thomas (2013) compare the labor market outcomes between firm-level 
and sector-level bargaining based on a small firm search and matching model. 
They find that unemployment is lower if firm-level bargaining is applied. Boeri 
and Burda (2009) show that firms as well as the median voter prefer collective 
over individual bargaining if a firing tax on a considerable fraction of workers is 
introduced.
Finally, the approach presented in this chapter is also related to other 
approaches of endogenous wage regime selection. For instance, Michelacci and 
Suarez (2006) investigate an environment, where firms can choose whether to 
post or bargain wages in a directed search model.7 If wages are posted, firms can 
increase the probability of filling a vacancy by offering higher wages. However, this 
also raises the probability that workers with a lower productivity apply. If wages 
are bargained, wage rates can be adjusted to the productivity of workers, but this 
reduces the probability of filling the vacancy. Michelacci and Suarez (2006) show 
that a simultaneous wage regime equilibrium exists if search inefficiencies and 
the dispersion of worker skills are at a medium level. Furthermore, some authors 
investigate the endogenous choice of the bargaining level, motivated by the 
seminal work of Calmfors and Driffill (1988) which finds that fully (de)centralized 
wage setting systems are superior over intermediate levels of wage bargaining 
(Ramaswamy and Rowthorn, 1993; Freeman and Gibbons, 1995; Petrakis and 
Vlassis, 2004).
Thus, the approach presented here is most similar to contributions in the 
literature which study the endogenous choice between different wage bargaining 
regimes in a general equilibrium framework considering different cost structures. 
This allows to analyze the links between wage-setting, labor demand and 
competition on product markets.
The main contribution of this chapter is to offer an explanation for the 
empirically relevant and significant share of collective agreements in many 
European countries, where at the same time the recognition of the agreement 
is at the discretion of the employer. The approach presented herein is based on 
transaction cost motives, emphasizing the effect of different modes of wage 
formation on the cost structure of the firms. The findings in this chapter can 
further help to explain the decline in collective agreement coverage rates in 
recent years, stressing the importance of goods and labor market interactions as 
an additional channel.
7 For a similar approach see Masui (2011).
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Moreover, as outlined above, the choice of firms between different bargaining 
regimes restricts union actions and industrial conflicts. This may explain why 
German firms adjusted wages rather than employment in the course of the 
economic shock triggered by the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009.8
The reminder is structured as follows: Section 2.2 outlines the evolution of 
collective agreement coverage in Germany between 1996–2011 and sketches the 
institutional background. Section 2.3 outlines the modeling framework. Section  2.4 
solves the model in partial equilibrium. This is done sequentially. Starting from 
a parsimonious definition, the model is extended step by step. The solution 
and comparative statics for selected parameters are investigated at each step. 
Section 2.5 shows the general equilibrium solution of the model and discusses the 
conditions for its existence. Section 2.6 discusses the model’s implications and 
puts them into perspective. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Collective bargaining regimes in Germany
Although decreasing since several years, collective agreements are still widely 
applied in the German system of industrial relations. In 2011, 32 percent of all 
establishments and about 60 percent of all workers have been covered by collective 
agreements of some sort. The predominant form are industry- or regional-level 
contracts (Flaechentarifvertrag), where unions bargain about wages and other 
employment conditions with an employers’ association. If a firm does not want to 
join an employers’ association it may also bargain with the union directly about 
firm-level contracts (Firmentarifvertrag ). Either way, the agreed wage constitutes 
a legally binding wage-floor.9
There are several important differences in the German system of industrial 
relations compared to other countries. First, union recognition is a choice made by 
the employer (Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Schönberg, 2009). This is, for instance, in 
contrast to the US, where firms are legally obliged to bargain with a union once 
workers decided for union representation by majority vote (DiNardo and Lee, 2004). 
These differences to the US do not imply that trade unions have no influence on 
collective agreement recognition. It rather emphasizes the importance of different 
systems of industrial relations. Second, collective agreements are often applied 
to all employees, whether they are union members or not. Otherwise, it would 
8 See Dustmann, Fitzenberger, Schönberg, and Spitz-Oener (2014), who argue that the governance structure of 
German industrial relations is the key factor for understanding why German firms adjusted at the internal rather 
than at the external margin to the economic shock in 2008 and 2009.
9 A third form of worker representation in Germany are plant-level agreements between the employer and their 
work council (Betriebsvereinbarung) and it is important to mention that these councils are not allowed to 
negotiate about issues that are normally covered by collective agreements, such as wages.
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give non-unionized workers additional incentives to become union members 
(Gürtzgen, 2009b).
Therefore union coverage is larger than union density in Germany, where union 
density is defined as the share of workers with union membership relative to all 
employees. For a detailed review of the German industrial relations system see 
Keller and Kirsch (2010).
Data of the IAB establishment panel are used to describe the evolution of 
collective bargaining coverage rates. The IAB establishment panel is a yearly 
conducted survey, which covers by now about 16,000 plants per year. Furthermore, 
it is the primary data source on collective bargaining coverage rates in Germany. 
Sampling is based on all plants with at least one employee subject to social security 
contributions. The data set contains detailed information on e.g. employment, 
revenues, investment and also covers information on whether a plant recognizes 
a single- or multi-employer collective agreement. For the figures presented 
below, all observations have been weighted by their inverse sampling probability. 
The survey is conducted in East and West Germany since 1996. More detailed 
information on the IAB establishment panel can be found in Fischer, Janik, Müller, 
and Schmucker (2009) and Kölling (2000).
Figure 2.1 shows the evolution of the share of firms which are either subject to 
a local (single-employer) agreement or a centralized (multi-employer) agreement. 
The share of firms covered by centralized wage agreements decreases from 
45 percent in 1996 to roughly 30 percent in 2011. This decrease has not been 
compensated by local agreements which remain at 3 percent between 1999 and 
2011. Therefore, the share of plants not subject to any form of collective agreement 
increases from 44 percent in 1996 to 68 percent in 2011. It has been documented 
that this recent decline in coverage rates is rather explained by changes in firm 
behavior than changes in firm composition (Addison, Teixeira, Bryson, and Pahnke, 
2013). Also switching between regimes is by far more frequent than commonly 
suggested (Addison, Bryson, Teixeira, Pahnke, and Bellmann, 2013).
Figure 2.2 displays the evolution of the collective bargaining coverage rate 
for the same period. In contrast to the previous figure, the coverage rate uses 
the number of workers subject to collective agreements relative to all workers. 
The qualitative picture remains unchanged. The share of workers subject to 
centralized agreements is decreasing between 1996 and 2011. Also the share 
of workers subject to local agreements is much smaller and almost constant 
at 10  percent. Therefore, the share of workers not covered by any collective 
agreement steadily increases between 1996 and 2011. The economic impact 
however is still significant. In 2011 about 60 percent of all workers have been 
subject to collective agreements.
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The observation that 60 percent of all workers, but only 32 percent of all plants, 
are covered by collective agreements in 2011 indicates that establishments subject 
to collective agreements are larger on average. Figure 2.3 displays the evolution 
of the share of firms covered by collective agreements for different size classes, 
where size is defined as the number of employees. Also here the overall picture 
remains unchanged. The share of firms without agreements is increasing over 
time at the cost of centralized agreements. The differences between size classes 
are substantial and evolve almost linearly. For instance, in 2011 only 19 percent of 
small establishments with 1 to 4 employees are subject to collective agreements, 
for medium sized firms it varies between 30 to 70 percent and reaches almost 
90  percent for large plants with more than 500 employees.
Figure 2.1: Collective agreement firm share
Collective bargaining regimes in Germany
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Figure 2.2: Collective bargaining coverage
Figure 2.3: Collective agreement firm share, by size classes
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Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show the evolution of the collective agreement firm share 
within manufacturing and service industries. In general the within-sector variation 
is larger, but the growing importance of firms without agreements is also present 
here. It is also shown that – with the exception of public administration – union 
recognition in service industries in generally lower. For instance in manufacturing 
industries such as machinery, car industries, and metal processing the share 
is traditionally high. Whereas wholesale and retail traders are almost never 
covered by collective agreements. In any case, Figures 2.4 and 2.5 document that 
simultaneous wage regimes are present even within industries and also in sectors 
where union representation is traditionally low. 
These results indicate several stylized facts, which are addressed in the 
subsequent sections: (i) Union coverage, measured in terms of workers or firms 
has been decreasing during the last two decades. (ii) This decrease in coverage 
can be attributed rather to different firm behavior than different firms. (iii) Union 
recognition is at the discretion of the employer. (iv) Firms subject to collective 
agreements are larger. (v) Simultaneous regimes are present even within single 
industries.
2.3 The model
This section extends the standard model of monopolistic competition with 
simultaneous wage regimes. The main properties are summarized briefly. 
The economy is endowed with N units of labor supplied inelastically. Workers 
derive utility from consuming a final output good, which is produced by using 
different intermediate inputs. Intermediate input producers are monopolistically 
competitive and are free to choose one of two wage regimes. In the first regime, 
wages are bargained between the firm and a firm-level union.10 In the second 
or non-unionized regime, a competitive wage rate is paid. The main assumption 
is that different wage formation mechanisms are associated with different cost 
structures.
Final output producers. Final output Q is homogeneous, produced under perfect 
competition and used for consumption or payment of costs. Technology of final 
output producers follows
  
(2.1)
10 Considering only one bargaining regime is a simplification compared to the previous section to keep the analysis 
tractable.
Q = M−
1
σ−1
[∫ M
0
q
σ−1
σ
i di
] σ
σ−1
,
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where σ > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution, M is the mass of differentiated 
intermediate inputs available for production and qi denotes the quantity of 
intermediate input variety i .11 Profit maximization of final output producers 
implies that demand for variety i follows
  (2.2)
where pi denotes the price of input variety i and E = PQ denotes expenditure on 
final output. The price P of final output Q, reads
  (2.3)
As shown in (2.2), demand for any variety i increases proportional to real average 
expenditure per variety, E / (PM ) , and decreases in its real price, pi /P, with 
elasticity σ. If all firms would charge the same price p, it follows from (2.3) that 
the price of final output becomes P = p. In this hypothetical scenario demand for 
each variety would equal real expeniture per variety.
Intermediate input firms. Intermediate inputs are produced under monopolistic 
competition.12 Each firm produces output with labor as the only factor of 
production and a linear homogeneous production technology,
  (2.4)
where φ denotes the productivity level which is common to all firms in the economy. 
Furthermore, by denoting variable costs of firm i by ci and the corresponding fixed 
cost of production by fi, profits of firm i are given by πi = pi (qi ) qi – ci (qi /φ) – Pfi. 
With fixed costs being paid in units of final output.13 Maximizing profits subject to 
(2.2) gives the usual constant markup pricing rule over marginal cost,
11 The first term on the right-hand side in (2.1) differs from the standard Dixit-Stiglitz model, as it eliminates external 
economies of scale effects. Therefore, the mass of varieties has no effect on aggregate output for any given level 
of aggregate input demand. This specification has been used in various contexts. For a detailed discussion see 
Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011), Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) and Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003).
12 The assumption of monopolistic competition broaden the set of results as it allows to model the interaction 
of product and labor market imperfections. Considering perfect competition instead does not alter the main 
conclusions.
13 The specification of fixed costs payments in units of final output is chosen for analytical tractability. The 
qualitative results would remain the same if, for instance, the fixed costs would be paid in labor. The labor 
market clearing conditions, however, would be much more complicated (Yeaple, 2005). Furthermore, it is a 
straightforward extension in models with more than one wage for the fixed costs to be billed in the same unit 
(Egger and Kreickemeier, 2009).
qi =
E
PM
(pi
P
)−σ
,
P =
[
1
M
∫ M
0
p1−σi di
] 1
1−σ
.
qi = φli,
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(2.5)
where σ / (σ – 1) denotes the markup over marginal costs. Using the demand 
equation (2.2) and the constant markup rule (2.5), profits of firm i can be 
written as
  (2.6)
Wage regimes. There exist two wage regimes in the economy. In one regime, the 
wage is determined by collective bargaining between a local union and the firm. 
The bargained wage rate is denoted by U . In the other regime, firms are not 
unionized and pay a competitive wage rate N .
The main assumption is that different forms of wage formation are associated 
with different cost structures.14 Additionally to general fixed costs of production  f, 
regime specific fixed costs aj for j ∈ {N, U} are assumed. Therefore, fixed costs of 
firm i in regime j are
  (2.7)
Furthermore, variable costs are composed of wages paid to the worker ( j ) and 
additional costs specific to the wage regime (bj )
  (2.8)
This difference in cost structures between wage regimes is crucial. There are 
other examples in the literature with a similar modeling strategy. For instance 
Lazear (1983) assumes that it is more costly for some firms to defend against 
unionization than it is for others. To this point it is not specified which regime is 
more “costly”, e.g. aU ??aN . This will be discussed together with the equilibrium in 
detail. For the moment it seems reasonable that differences in the wage formation 
process are also reflected in differences in the cost structure.
14 The nature of this costs is deliberately kept general. Yet, in light of the more recent applications in search 
environments, one may think of them as bargaining cost (Pissarides, 2009). It seems fair to assume that 
bargaining itself is not costless but rather involves additional resources such as time. In this case, dealing with 
a single entity gives rise to economies of scale compared to a situation where the rm engages with each worker 
individually. Alternatively, one could interpret these costs as all other sorts of (non-wage) labor costs paid by the 
rm (Lazear, 1983) or the union (MacDonald and Robinson, 1992; Dinlersoz and Greenwood, 2012).
πi =
1
σ
E
M
(pi
P
)1−σ
− Pfi.
pi =
σ
σ − 1
ci
φ
,
fi(j) =
{
fN
fU
}
= f +
{
aN if j = N,
aU if j = U.
ci(j) =
{
wN + bN if j = N,
wU + bU if j = U.
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One of the main contributions of this model is that firms are then allowed to 
choose their wage regime. If they decide to engage in collective agreements, 
they face a set of costs { U, bU, fU}. If they choose the non-unionized regime, 
they pay { N,  bN ,  fN}. Furthermore, firms are allowed to switch regimes 
instantaneously at no cost. Switching between regimes continues until no firm 
can be made better off in the other regime. There are three potential outcomes: 
(i) all firms choose to be non-unionized, (ii) all firms choose to be unionized, and 
(iii) some firms choose to be unionized while the others refrain from engaging in 
collective agreements. The emphasis of this modeling approach is on simultaneous 
wage regimes and therefore the focus will be on the third scenario. Below, the 
determinants are derived for which both, unionized and non-unionized firms, 
coexist in equilibrium.
Union wage bargaining. Bargaining between the firm and the union is modeled 
in a very standard way and involves firm-level wages alone, whereas the firm 
retains its right-to-manage (Nickell and Andrews, 1983). The bargain is described 
by the generalized Nash solution such that the bargained wage maximizes 
[( U – ˜ ) lU ( U )]
β [πU (lU ( U )) – πU (0)]
1– β, where β represents the bargaining 
weight of the union and ˜  the fallback wage of workers in case of disagreement. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that fixed costs are already sunk at the bargaining 
stage. Therefore the contribution of the firm to the bargain is its operational 
profit. The solution to this maximization problem is (see Appendix 2.A)
 
The bargained wage increases in the workers’ fallback option (˜ ),15 the bargaining 
power of the union (β) and the variable regime costs (bU ) . The wage decreases 
with more competition (higher σ). If bU = 0, equation (2.9) reduces to the standard 
solution of right-to-manage wage bargaining under monopolistic competition, 
where the union bargains a markup over the workers’ fallback option (e.g Blanchard 
and Giavazzi, 2003). Defining the union wage markup by θ  ≡ (σ – 1 + β) / (σ – 1) we 
can write the union wage equation as
   (2.9)
15 The specication of the workers' fallback option in the context of simultaneous wage regimes is not self-evident. 
We will discuss later different alternatives, depending on the framework applied.
wU =
σ − 1 + β
σ − 1 w˜ +
β
σ − 1bU .
wU = θw˜ + (θ − 1) bU .
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Further note that the results do not depend on the assumption of right-to-manage 
bargaining. Alternative specifications, such as efficient bargaining (McDonald and 
Solow, 1981) are equally appropriate and would yield qualitatively the very same 
predictions. The necessary element is that the wage formation process is linked to 
aggregate values. The choice of right-to-manage bargaining is made for two reasons. 
First, an explicit description of the wage formation process allows for a closed form 
solution of the model and therefore a better understanding of the simultaneous 
wage regime framework. Second, right-to-manage bargaining is closer tailored 
towards the European model of industrial relations.
Equilibrium conditions. Since firms are homogeneous within each wage regime, 
we can drop individual subscript i and refer to the wage regime index j ∈ {N, U} 
instead. The description of the model is completed by the following set of equilibrium 
conditions.
Product market clearing: The goods market is cleared if real expenditures 
(E / P ) equal total real revenues 
(∫M
0
(pi/P ) qidi
)
. It is easy to verify that this is 
equivalent with the price index equation in (2.3) to hold. Since firms are equal 
within each wage regime, the price index can be rewritten in terms of real prices 
such that
  (2.10)
where μU denotes the share of firms in the unionized regime, i.e. μU = MU / M.
Regime indifference condition: Firms are free to choose between regimes at 
every instance. A simultaneous wage regime equilibrium therefore requires that 
no firm has an incentive to leave its regime. This is the case if profits are equal in 
both regimes. This translates formally into
  (2.11)
Free entry condition: There exists a mass of potential entrants to the market. 
Suppose an initial situation where firms in the market are able to generate positive 
profits. This will trigger additional entrants into the market and eventually reduce 
the profits of the incumbent firms. This process will go on until no additional firm 
has an incentive to enter the market, i.e. until profits are zero
  (2.12)
1 = (1− μU)
(pN
P
)1−σ
+ μU
(pU
P
)1−σ
,
πN = πU .
πj = 0.
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Labor market clearing: The labor market is cleared if the total mass of persons 
employed L ≡  MN lN +  MU lU  =  LN + LU  is equal to the labor endowment N
  (2.13)
2.4 Partial equilibrium
2.4.1 Preliminary remarks
First intuition. The aim of this model is to explore the characteristics of 
simultaneous wage regimes within a given industry. The solution of such a model 
is quite different compared to the workhorse models of monopolistic competition. 
The reason for this can be best explained by the goods market clearing condition. 
Solving (2.10) for the share of union firms gives 
A simultaneous wage regime equilibrium requires 0 < μU < 1. Therefore, such an 
equilibrium exists only if pN > P >  pU  or pN < P <  pU . Note that these are two 
conditions, because we have not determined yet which regime offers the lower 
prices. Combining both equations and expressing product prices in real terms, 
gives a central condition for understanding the existence of simultaneous wage 
regimes, i.e.
  (2.14)
Economically, condition (2.14) is almost trivial. It simply states that if firms in 
one regime charge a price above the “average”, the firms in the other regime 
need to charge a price below the “average”. Otherwise one of the two regimes will 
vanish. It is also important to note that this result depends on the as-sumption 
of two wage regimes and not on monopolistically competitive price setting. One 
can easily show that if firms are price takers and production technology exhibits 
decreasing returns to scale, an equivalent result with respect to the wage sum 
instead of prices applies.
A second issue is the role of the regime indifference condition in (2.11). It 
requires that profits are equal in both regimes, say they are equal to an arbitrary 
value π¯, which can be positive, negative or zero. Hence πN = π¯, and πU = π¯.
L = N.
μU =
1− (pN/P )1−σ
(pU/P )
1−σ − (pN/P )1−σ
.
pU
P
{
> 1 >
< 1 <
}
pN
P
.
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Figure 2.6: Profits and the regime indifference condition
Using the markup pricing equation (2.5) in the profit equation (2.6), Figure 2.6 
plots real profits in both regimes against real wages. To generate this figure 
fN > fU  is assumed, but only for illustrative purposes. Profits of both types of firms 
are decreasing in wages. However, since fN > fU  is assumed for this plot, profits in 
the bargaining regime will be always larger compared to the other regime for any 
given wage. It is now crucial to note, that the firm’s decision problem is not about 
choosing its regime for given wages. As mentioned before, the firm chooses the set 
{ j , bj , fj} for j ∈ {N, U} by comparing its profits. Suppose now that for an initial 
sorting of firms μU 0 , unionized firms pay very high wages and non-unionized 
firms pay very low wages. For this initial sorting the firm can only pick one of two 
values πU ( U (μU 0 )) / P  or πN ( N (μU 0 )) / P. Since profits in the regime without 
bargaining are higher, more and more firms will move to this regime. However, as 
the share of non-unionized firms increases, wages in this regime will increase as 
well. This switching process will continue until the equilibrium sorting is reached 
and πU ( U (μU )) / P = πN ( N (μU )) / P = π¯ / P. This is shown in Figure 2.6 by the 
intersection of the horizontal line with both profit curves.
Scenarios and parametrization. So far the relative cost advantages or 
disadvantages between the two regimes have not been specified and we will 
continue to do so. The reason is that we want to study cost relations that are 
consistent with simultaneous wage regimes and therefore the outcome should not 
be predefined by the assumption. To keep the analysis tractable we will distinguish 
between two scenarios. Scenario 1 assumes that unionized firms have high fixed 
and low variable regime costs, i.e. fN > fU and bN < bU . In Scenario 2 these cost 
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relations are reversed, fN < fU   and bN > bU . The parameter values used during the 
different numerical exercises are summarized in Table 2.1.
For the baseline most parameters are normalized. The price for the final output 
good is used as numeraire and therefore set to unity, P = 1. Also aggregate values 
which relate to the size of the economy (and not determined endogenously) are 
normalized to one. This includes aggregate expenditures E, the mass of firms 
M, labor endowment N and firm productivity φ. The employment share is set 
to χ = 0.9 to simulate an unemployment rate of 10 percent, a realistic value for 
European countries. The bargaining weight is set to β = 0.5 a standard value in 
the literature (Felbermayr and Prat, 2011) and close to other values used (Acikgo¨z 
and Kaymak, 2014). The elasticity of substitution between varieties, governing 
partly the degree of competition, is set to σ = 3, which is at the lower bound of a 
rather wide range of values used in the literature (Delacroix, 2006). Moreover, the 
value of σ is often calibrated significantly lower for Europe compared to the US 
(Ebell and Haefke, 2006; Felbermayr and Prat, 2011). Finally, the union fallback 
wage and the alternative income are set such that they allow for coherent values 
in the specified framework.
Table 2.1: Benchmark parameter values
Parameter Name Value
P Aggregate price index 1.0
E Aggregate expenditure 1.0
M Mass of active firms 1.0
N Labor endowment 1.0
φ Productivity 1.0
χ Employment share 0.9
β Bargaining power 0.5
o Elasticity of substitution 3.0
˜ Fallback wage 0.5
? 0 Alternative income 0.1
Scenario 1
fN Non-union fixed cost 5.0
fU Union fixed cost 1.0
bN Non-union variable cost 0.0
bU Union variable cost 0.1
Scenario 2
fN Non-union fixed cost 1.0
fU Union fixed cost 5.0
bN Non-union variable cost 1.0
bU Union variable cost 0.0
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2.4.2 Product market equilibrium
The description of the equilibrium is developed in several steps. Starting with the 
most parsimonious interpretation by keeping most of variables fixed, more and 
more variables are endogeneized.
The first equation to consider is obviously the goods market clearing 
condition. But equalizing only product demand and supply gives little insight. 
It is already summarized in (2.14) and rather tautological. It states that an 
equilibrium exists if an equilibrium exists. Therefore, we start by considering 
a product market equilibrium in which the goods market is cleared and all 
firms made their decisions. The decisions include optimal pricing, hiring, 
wage bargaining, firm entry/exit and regime choice. This is formalized by the 
following definition:
Definition 1. For given values of real expenditure E/P and the real fallback wage 
˜ /P, a partial (simultaneous wage regime) equilibrium is defined as a decuple / ({
(qj, lj, wj/P, pj/P )j∈{N,U} ,M, μU
}
 satisfying (2.2), (2.4), (2.5) for j ∈ {N, U} 
and (2.9)–(2.12).
Reduced form. Using the goods market clearing condition (2.10), we can solve for 
the share of unionized firms in terms of real prices, such that
  (2.15)
Applying the regime indifference condition (2.11) and the free entry condition 
(2.12), we can write profits in (2.6) as
  (2.16)
  (2.17)
Combining (2.15)–(2.17) and setting π¯  =  0 we can express the real price of 
unionized firms in terms of μU and exogenous variables, such that
μU =
1− (pN
P
)1−σ(
pU
P
)1−σ − (pN
P
)1−σ .
E
σPM
(pN
P
)1−σ
− fN = π¯
P
,
E
σPM
(pU
P
)1−σ
− fU = π¯
P
.
pU
P
=
[
μU
(
1− fN
fU
)
+
fN
fU
] 1
σ−1
.
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Using the union wage equation (2.9) in the markup pricing rule (2.5) gives 
The partial equilibrium in Definition 1 is a special case, in the sense that there 
exists a closed form solution. Combining the last two equations we find the share 
of unionized firms
However, as the analysis is refined and developed towards general equilibrium, 
a closed form solution is not possible. To be consistent with later sections, the 
reduced form is defined as a system of two unknowns {μU , pU / P} and two 
equations
Eq.1:  (2.18)
Eq.2:  (2.19)
Figure 2.7 shows the graphical partial equilibrium solution for the two scenarios 
and parameters specified in Table 2.1. It plots equations (2.18) and (2.19) against 
μU ∈ (0, 1). Clearly the equilibrium is determined by the intersection of both 
curves.
Figure 2.7: Graphical illustration
pU
P
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σ
σ − 1
θ
Pφ
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fU
fU − fN
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σ − 1
θ
Pφ
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P
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In both scenarios the equilibrium value of μU  is rather high, but the value itself is 
of minor interest at this stage. Since ˜  is treated exogenous one could always set 
it such that the equilibrium share is calibrated towards real data. The main focus 
is to see whether an equilibrium exists at all, i.e. (i) if the two lines intersect and 
(ii) if the intersection lies within the parameter range of μU .
Comparative statics. For the comparative static exercises, we always proceed 
in the same way. Equations (2.18) and (2.19) are solved numerically for each 
scenario, knowing from Figure 2.7 that a solution exists. Then, the exogenous 
parameter is reduced and the new equilibrium computed. This step is repeated 
until no solution is found and the lower bound is reached. Then, we increase the 
exogenous parameter step by step until again no solution is found and the upper 
bound is reached. Figure 2.8 plots these steps for the main variable of interest, 
the union firm share μU , against the fallback wage ˜ . In the left column, it is 
assumed that fU  < fN , whereas the opposite is assumed in the right column. 
Figure  2.8 shows that the union firm share μU is decreasing in ˜  if unionized firms 
have a fixed cost advantage, and vice versa. The key element for this result can be 
seen by combining (2.16) and (2.17) and inserting the pricing equation  (2.5) and 
union wage equation (2.9), which gives
An increase in the fallback wage ˜  will increase the wages in both regimes. 
However, if fU < fN , the increase in the non-union wage is less than proportional. 
Therefore, the resulting increase in the non-union price is less than proportional, 
favoring the non-union regime. Note that the effect of the fallback wage on the 
share of unionized firms is independent whether unionized firms pay higher or 
lower wages. It is only dependent on the relative fixed cost advantage and the 
results will be reversed for fU > fN . To summarize these results: an increase in the 
fallback wage increases the share of firms with the higher fixed costs, because 
these firms are the ones with the lower prices and will adjust prices less than 
proportional.
Figure 2.9 repeats the exercise by varying the productivity level φ. The effects 
on the union share are reversed compared to Figure 2.8 because an increase 
in productivity reduces the prices. The importance of cost advantages remains 
unaltered.
To complete the discussion, Figure 2.10 varies the elasticity of substitution σ. 
It shows that the effect of more competition (higher σ) is ambiguous in partial 
equilibrium and depends on given values of exogenous parameters and the fallback 
wN + bN
θw˜ + θbU
=
(
fU
fN
) 1
σ−1
.
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wage. Therefore, the share of unionized firms can be increasing or decreasing with 
or without a hump shape if the elasticity of substitution changes.
Figure 2.8: Comparative statics with respect to the union fallback wage ( ˜ )
Figure 2.9: Comparative statics with respect to the firms’ productivity (φ)
Figure 2.10: Comparative statics with respect to the elasticty of substitution (σ)
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2.4.3 Endogeneizing the fallback wage
As a next step the fallback wage is integrated into the analysis. If the bargaining 
between the firm and the local union fails, workers can look for a job anywhere in 
the economy. That means they could find a job in unionized firms or non-unionized 
firms. Since this is a partial equilibrium analysis, there could be additional jobs 
which belong to neither wage regime and pay wage rate ω 0. Therefore, the fallback 
wage is the average wage of all workers and reads
  (2.20)
where χ denotes the employment share of all workers in one of the two regimes 
and λj ≡ Lj  / L is the employment share in regime j ∈ {N, U}.
Parameter χ has also a more convenient interpretation. Since this is a one 
sector model, there are no jobs outside the sector. Therefore, each worker in the 
economy can be in one of three states, (i) employed in regime N , (ii) employed 
in regime U, or (iii) being unemployed and receiving unemployment benefits ω 0. 
Thus, the unemployment rate is fixed and simply equals to u = 1 – χ, where χ can 
be interpreted as employment rate.
Equation (2.20) adds an extra condition for the identification of the additional 
endogenous variable ˜ . The definition of this extended equilibrium is:
Definition 2. For given values of real expenditure E/P and employment share χ,  
an extended partial equilibrium is defined as an undecuple  {
(qj, lj, wj/P, pj/P )j∈{N,U} ,M, μU , w˜
}
satisfying (2.2), (2.4), (2.5)  
for j ∈ {N, U}, (2.9)–(2.12) and (2.20).
Reduced form. It is shown in Appendix 2.B, that the reduced form solution to the 
system in Definition 2 is 
Eq.1:  (2.21)
Eq.2:  (2.22)
where
  (2.23)
w˜ = χ [λNwN + λUwU ] + (1− χ)ω0,
pU
P
=
[
μU
(
1− fN
fU
)
+
fN
fU
] 1
σ−1
,
pU
P
=
σ
σ − 1
θ [w˜ + bU ]
Pφ
,
w˜ + bU =
−χρ (μU) bN − χbU + bU (1 + ρ (μU)) + (1 + ρ (μU)) (1− χ)ω0
(1 + ρ (μU))− χρ (μU) θ
(
fN
fU
) 1
1−σ − χθ
,
( )
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and
  (2.24)
Figure 2.11 shows the graphical solution by plotting (2.21) and (2.22) against 
μU ∈ (0, 1) subject to (2.23) and (2.24). The solid line remains unchanged compared 
to the graphical solution in Figure 2.7. The dashed line however is no longer 
constant because the fallback wage now evolves according to (2.23) and has a 
undefined point in Scenario 1. Interestingly, the dashed line still evolves strictly 
monotone and into the opposite direction as the solid line.
Figure 2.11: Graphical illustration
Comparative statics. The comparative statics are conducted in the same way as 
in the previous section. The reduced form system is solved numerically at each 
instant. Since the fallback wage ˜   is now endogenous, the alternative income ω 0 
is used instead. Figure 2.12 shows that the share of unionized firms is decreasing 
in the alternative income ω 0. It is interesting to note that the union share is 
decreasing in both scenarios.
The reason is that ceteris paribus and provided an equilibrium exists, ω 0 has a 
positive (negative) effects on ˜ , and ˜   negative (positive) effect on μU , depending 
on the scenario.
The qualitative effect of φ  on μU  remains unaffected (Figure 2.13). The reason 
is that φ itself has no direct effect on the fallback wage in (2.23). Therefore the 
system reacts similar to the previous specification.
Figure 2.14 then shows that the effect of σ  on the union share also can remain 
ambiguous depending for instance on the alternative income ω 0.
ρ (μU) =
1− μU
μU
(
fN
fU
) σ
σ−1
.
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2.44 Endogeneizing the employment share
Given the reduced form solution in the previous section, we continue by 
endogeneizing the employment share χ, which is defined as the share of workers 
employed in one of the two regimes L over the total mass of workers N, i.e.
  (2.25)
Therefore, (2.25) adds an extra equation for the new endogenous variable χ. 
Formally, the definition of the partial equilibrium is refined to:
Definition 3. For given values of real expenditure E/P, an extended partial 
equilibrium is defined as a duodecuple {(qj, lj, j / P, pj / P)j ∈ {N, U} , M, μU , ˜ , χ} 
satisfying (2.2), (2.4), (2.5) for j ∈{N, U}, (2.9)–(2.12), (2.20) and (2.25).
Figure 2.12: Comparative statics with respect to the alternative income (ω 0)
Figure 2.13: Comparative statics with respect to the firms’ productivity (φ)
χ =
L
N
.
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Figure 2.14: Comparative statics with respect to the elasticty of substitution (σ)
Reduced form. It is shown in Appendix 2.B, that the reduced form solution to the 
system in Definition 3 is given by
Eq.1:  (2.26)
Eq.2:  (2.27)
where
  (2.28)
and
  (2.29)
and
  (2.30)
The two main conditions are as before equations (2.26) and (2.27). Equations 
(2.28)–(2.30) are shortcuts which need to be substituted into (2.27) which is 
skipped here to avoid a very cluttered notation.
The solution for the employment share in (2.30) has further interesting 
properties. The term within brackets equate to unity evaluated at the corner 
solutions μU = 0 and μU = 1. For values in between, the term within brackets will 
be always larger than one due to Jensen’s inequality. That means for given real 
pU
P
=
[
μU
(
1− fN
fU
)
+
fN
fU
] 1
σ−1
,
pU
P
=
σ
σ − 1
θ [w˜ + bU ]
Pφ
,
w˜ + bU =
−χρ (μU) bN − χbU + bU (1 + ρ (μU)) + (1 + ρ (μU)) (1− χ)ω0
(1 + ρ (μU))− χρ (μU) θ
(
fN
fU
) 1
1−σ − χθ
,
ρ (μU) =
1− μU
μU
(
fN
fU
) σ
σ−1
,
χ =
1
N
E
Pφ
[
(1− μU) (fN)
σ
σ−1 μU (fU)
σ
σ−1
((1− μU) fN + μUfU)
σ
σ−1
]
.
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expenditures, the economy needs to employ more workers if simultaneous wage 
regimes exist compared to a situation with one single wage regime. Interestingly, 
this finding resembles the conclusions of Calmfors and Driffill in their seminal paper 
(Calmfors and Driffill, 1988), yet from a completely different angle. In contrast to 
Calmfors and Driffill, this hump shape is generated within a single sector and 
union wage bargaining is not subject to different levels of centralization. The 
reason for this similarities is the isoelastic demand system, which generates the 
term in brackets in equation (2.30).
Figure 2.15 shows again the graphical solution for the two scenarios. For 
the baseline parametrization an endogenous employment share implies ceteris 
paribus a lower union share in both scenarios. Due to the previously discussed 
hump shape, it is not clear whether this holds for wider range of parameter values. 
For this, we turn again to the comparative statics.
Figure 2.15: Graphical illustration
Comparative statics. Figure 2.16 shows the comparative statics for ω 0. As in the 
previous section, the effect of ω 0 on μU  is the same in both scenarios. This time, 
however, the effect is positive implying that a higher alternative income outside 
the two wage regimes is associated with a higher share of unionized firms. One 
has to keep in mind that this is a partial equilibrium result, i.e. conditioned on 
given real expenditures.
A higher level of productivity implies a higher union share in Scenario 1 and a 
mostly lower union share in Scenario 2 (see Figure 2.17). In the second scenario, 
the effect is generally undetermined due to the ambiguous relation between the 
union share and the employment share discussed in the reducedform section.
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The results of  φ are almost reversed when we focus on the effects of σ in 
Figure  2.18. In Scenario 1, a higher σ is associated with a lower μU , but is 
ambiguous in Scenario 2.
Summarizing the results of these exercises, we find that for this type of 
equilibrium the range of solutions is rather limited in Scenario 1. With exception 
of the effects of φ, the possible set of solutions is very limited and even after small 
changes in the exogenous parameter no numerical solution is found. In Scenario  2 
on the other hand, the effects are mostly ambiguous depending on the actual 
parametrization.
2.5 General equilibrium
To this point, all but one equation have been used for the description of several 
stages of partial equilibria. The remaining process that needs to be determined is 
the wage formation process in the non-unionized regime to solve for the general 
equilibrium of this model. The last equation of the model which has not been used 
so far is the labor market clearing condition in (2.13). It states that the mass of 
workers employed in the two regimes has to equal to the labor endowment, i.e.
  (2.31)
In other words, in general equilibrium, wages in the non-unionized regime adjust 
until the labor market is cleared. In this sense, the wage N resembles the market 
clearing wage in the standard model of frictionless labor markets.
In principal, there is an alternative general equilibrium specification. If wages 
in the non-unionized regime are determined by any process N = N (.) , the general 
equilibrium of this model would imply an unemployment rate different from zero. 
Possible processes include all sorts of wage determination which are in line with 
the modeling framework, such as individual bargaining, efficiency wages, etc. This 
modeling approach is beyond the scope of this chapter for two reasons: The first 
one is for rather technical matters because the hump shape of the employment 
share in (2.30) gives rise to multiple equilibria. The second reason is that the aim 
of this model is to study the properties of simultaneous wage regimes. If labor 
demand equals labor supply, the textbook model of monopolistic competition is 
the corner solution without unionized firms, i.e. μU  = 0. This allows for a direct 
evaluation, in the sense that all differences to the workhorse model can be traced 
back to simultaneous wage regimes.
L = N.
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Figure 2.16: Comparative statics with respect to the alternative income (ω 0)
Figure 2.17: Comparative statics with respect to the firms’ productivity (φ)
Figure 2.18: Comparative statics with respect to the elasticty of substitution (σ )
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2.5.1 Reduced form
The reduced form in general equilibrium can be derived instantaneously based on 
the equations of the previous sections. If labor demand equals labor supply the 
employment share is simply equal to one. Substituting χ = 1 into the previous 
reduced form system, we can write 
  (2.32)
  (2.33)
where
  (2.34)
As in the previous section, the analysis starts with plotting the graphical solution 
in Figure 2.19. Again, an equilibrium exists and is unique for both scenarios in 
the baseline parametrization. The visual solution does not change significantly in 
general equilibrium.
Figure 2.19: Graphical illustration
2.5.2 Equilibrium condition
The simpler structure in general equilibrium also allows to define the equilibrium 
analytically and is summarized in the following proposition.
Eq.1 :
pU
P
=
[
μU
(
1− fN
fU
)
+
fN
fU
] 1
σ−1
,
Eq.2 :
pU
P
=
σ
σ − 1
θ [w˜ + bU ]
Pφ
,
w˜ + bU =
bU − bN
1− θ
(
fN
fU
) −1
σ−1 − θ−1
ρ(μU )
.
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Proposition 1. A general equilibrium with simultaneous wage regimes and 
endogenous regime selection exists and is unique if 
  (2.35)
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix 2.C
The condition in (2.35) offers several insights as both scenarios are summarized 
in one equation. (i) Differences in cost structures between the two regimes is a 
necessary condition for simultaneous wage regimes with endogenous selection. 
Otherwise this condition cannot be satisfied. (ii) Differences in variable and 
fixed regime costs are necessary to guarantee that both scenarios are potential 
equilibrium outcomes. If variable regime costs are equal, i.e. bN  = bU , an 
equilibrium exists (if at all) only if fN  > fU . If fixed regime costs are equal, i.e. 
fN  = fU , an equilibrium possibly exists if bN > bU . (iii) A less technical explanation 
can be given if we rewrite the condition in terms of real product prices which gives
Assuming for instance that unionized firms are the ones with the higher prices 
(Scenario 1) this condition states that the price difference between unionized 
and non-unionized firms has to be larger than the union wage markup over 
the fallback wage, adjusted for differences in variable bargaining costs. Loosely 
speaking, it states that if some firms pay above the average wage, there need to 
be some other firms paying below the average wage.
Not surprisingly, regime cost differences are the crucial component in this 
setup. Without this element one could not explain why otherwise identical firms 
choose to behave differently. The other assumptions do not necessarily affect 
the results. Monopolistic competition in the product market allows to model the 
notion of a firm more explicitly and extends the analysis for different degrees 
of imperfect competition. With perfect competition the mass of firms would 
be undetermined but the properties implied by labor market clearing would be 
unaffected. The right-to-manage wage bargaining model could be replaced by 
other theories of wage formation, such as efficient bargaining, efficiency wages or 
even monopoly unions. The model could also be extended to allow for search and 
matching frictions. Costly search generates rents for matched worker-firm pairs 
and would imply that workers in the non-unionized sector bargain individually. 
The system of equations would be augmented by an additional equation and the 
labor market clearing condition would be extended to allow for unemployment. 
(
fN
fU
) 1
σ−1
− θ > σ
σ − 1
θ [bU − bN ]
Pφ
.
pU (wU)
θpN (wN)
− 1 > pU (w)
P
− pN (w)
P
.
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Although the system of equations keeps its structure, the model’s analytical 
tractability would be reduced tremendously.
2.5.3 Comparative statics
Eight exogenous parameters describe the general equilibrium in (2.32) and (2.33). 
We will not discuss each parameter because for some, the results are embedded 
in the assumptions. For instance, the share of unionized firms decreases in its 
own regime specific fixed costs and increases in the fixed costs of the others. 
Instead, we discuss the productivity level φ, the elasticity of substitution σ, the 
union bargaining weight β, and the regime independent fixed costs component  f.16 
Figure 2.20 displays the comparative statics for φ. The union share μU  is increasing 
in Scenario 1 and decreasing in Scenario 2, because equation (2.33) is shifted 
downwards for an increasing productivity level. Figure 2.21 shows that an increase 
in σ, decreases the union share in Scenario 1, because higher values of σ, lower the 
relative price. Lower relative prices imply lower relative wages and outweigh the 
effect of a lower wage markup which would favor union recognition. The opposite 
effect holds for Scenario 2. Figure 2.22 plots the comparative statics for increasing 
values of β. Not surprisingly a higher bargaining weight reduces the union firm 
share in both scenarios. Finally, Figure 2.23 shows the effects of changes in the 
regime independent fixed cost component f. An increase in f decreases the relative 
price and therefore highlights the importance of differences in fixed costs. In 
Scenario 1, the higher f, the more weight is attributed to the higher union wage, 
and therefore the lower is μU . In Scenario 2 the opposite holds because the non-
unionized regime is less attractive as a higher f  increases the importance of the 
variable regime costs bN .
16 This fixed cost component has been defined in equation (2.7).
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Discussion of the results
Figure 2.20: Comparative statics with respect to the firms’ productivity (φ)
Figure 2.21: Comparative statics with respect to the elasticty of substitution (σ)
Figure 2.22: Comparative statics with respect to the union bargaining weight ( β )
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Figure 2.23: Comparative statics with respect to the firms’ fixed costs of production (f )
2.6 Discussion of the results
How can this model help to explain and understand the decrease in collective 
bargaining coverage rates during the last two decades? The answer to this question 
first depends on whether one assumes that the union wage regime is associated 
with high fixed costs and low variable costs or vice versa. Once differences in 
fixed costs are incorporated into a theoretical model, they ultimately result in 
differences in firm size. Firms with higher fixed costs, need to sell more output 
and hire more workers to cover these fixed costs. Especially in a framework 
of constant markup pricing. One of the most distinct empirical characteristics 
between firms in collective bargaining regimes and those who are not, is that 
they are larger. Therefore, the results that have been labeled as “Scenario 2” in the 
previous sections seem to be more realistic and are the preferred specification. In 
Scenario  2, unionized firms have higher fixed costs and are consequently larger. 
However, one has to keep in mind that these size differences are conditioned on 
the wage regime choice.
In the light of the results of Scenario 2 in the previous section, a decrease in 
collective bargaining coverage rates is consistent with a higher technological level, 
a lower elasticity of substitution, a higher union bargaining weight, and higher 
regime independent fixed costs. The results are now discussed in more detail.
Technology. Suppose the technology level φ increases due to a positive technology 
shock. This has a direct and positive effect on all wages because the pie that 
can be distributed has become larger. But since all wages are increasing, so does 
the average wage, and consequently also the bargained wage. Whereas the non-
unionized workers are only affected by the first effect, unionized workers can 
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also benefit from the positive effect of the non-unionized workers. Both effects 
combined generate a larger wage increase in the unionized regime. A relatively 
higher union wage makes this wage regime less attractive for employers. The 
stronger the technological shock the more firms will switch to the non-unionized 
regime. This result resembles the finding of Donado and Wälde (2012) in the sense 
that unions are the victims of their own success.
Bargaining power. An increase in the bargaining weight β increases the wage 
markup over the fallback wage and by that increases union wages alone. Clearly, 
this reduces the attractiveness of the unionized regime. Put differently, this result 
states that the collective bargaining coverage is decreasing because of growing 
union power.
This result seems questionable but a few comments are in order here. First, this 
result emphasizes the importance of endogenous wage regime choices. The higher 
the union wage demand, the lower the attractiveness for the employer. Opting out 
of a collective agreement is more complicated in reality, but in the long-run unions 
will be met by a larger opposition from the employer side. This effect is new to the 
trade union literature. Standard trade union models assume that unions simply 
exist and their wage demands are only restricted by the effects on the employment 
chances of their members. Here, a new channel is added by denying the union the 
possibility to represent their members in wage negotiations.
Second, summarizing all union behavior in one parameter is very stylized.
Therefore several different components could be embedded in this single 
parameter. It is sometimes suggested in the literature that the union power can be 
approximated by the union density, i.e. the share of workers the unions are able to 
mobilize. Since union membership numbers are declining over the last decades, this 
seems not reasonable in this context. Alternatively, one could assume that unions 
choose their wage markup endogenously. In this case, the results would indicate 
that unions have increased their wage demands at the cost of loosing part of the 
workforce they represent. But it is admittedly a drawback of the chosen modeling 
approach to reduce union behavior to one single parameter.
Third, the results refer to within sector considerations. Allowing for a multi-
sector setup could help to reconcile these findings.
Elasticity of substitution. An increase in the elasticity of substitution σ increases 
the share of unionized firms. The reason for this is that higher values of σ reduce 
the relative goods price by dampening the effect of differences in fixed costs. At 
the same time a higher elasticity of substitution reduces the wage markup of the 
union and by this the wage in the unionized regime. Therefore, the wage in the 
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unionized regime is dampened more than proportional and the attractiveness of 
this regime increases.
Higher values of σ also reduce the price markup over marginal costs. Therefore 
the elasticity of substitution is commonly used as proxy for the degree of competition. 
Does this imply that the results suggest that the decrease in collective bargaining 
coverage rates can be attributed to lower competition? The answer depends on how 
well a constant elasticity of substitution captures the degree of competition. This 
has been criticized in the literature because a constant elasticity of substitution 
implies that the price markup is independent of the number of incumbent firms (e.g. 
Zhelobodko, Kokovin, Parenti, and Thisse, 2012). Several authors in the literature 
have therefore departed from the CES approach when studying the interactions 
between product and labor market imperfections (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003; 
Ebell and Haefke, 2009; Felbermayr and Prat, 2011). These authors model elasticity 
of substitution to be dependent on the number of firms in the market, at least in 
the long run. The approach of Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) is closely related 
to the one presented herein. In fact, instead of non-unionized firms their model 
features unemployed workers. They show that in the long-run, the elasticity of 
substitution has no effect on unemployment.
Regime independent fixed costs. As the regime independent fixed costs  f  increase, 
the differences in variable regime costs become important. Therefore, an increase 
in f is associated with a larger share of unionized firms. This result is interesting as 
it includes two explanations. First, one could think of f as part of the production 
technology. In that case, the model explains the decline in collective bargaining 
coverage rates as result of technical progress. This is similar to result on the 
productivity level.
Second, f could also be interpreted as a market entry barrier.17 It could comprise 
product market regulations or other formal or informal payments. Then, the 
interpretation would be that union coverage rates have decreased due to product 
market deregulation. One can also think about the reduction of tariffs and formal 
standardization in the course of the economic integration of the European Union. 
These interpretations of f are not mutually exclusive.
2.7 Conclusion
The main contribution of this chapter is to model collective bargaining as a distinct 
firm choice, considering the cost structures of different wage-setting regimes. 
17 Again, this interpretation is used by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003).
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Conclusion
This approach is in line with the system of industrial relations in many European 
countries but has attracted almost no attention so far in the theoretical literature. 
It also challenges the view that firms oppose unions per se because they reduce 
profits due to higher wages. Selection into wage regimes is driven by differences 
in the cost structure. It is shown that these differences are sufficient to allow for 
simultaneous wage regimes. Furthermore, the comparative statics show that the 
results are consistent with several stylized facts and the related literature if we 
assume that fixed costs are larger and variable regime costs are lower (Scenario 2). 
Firms which opt for collective bargaining are larger than those choosing individual 
level wage contracts. Moreover, collective bargaining coverage is decreasing as 
technology advances and product markets are deregulated.
The model captures nicely the main idea that the choice between different 
regimes of wage bargaining is determined by differences in the cost structure from 
the employers’ perspective. Nevertheless, several extensions could help to deepen 
and underpin the understanding of the wage setting processes. For instance, firm size 
is conditioned on the wage regime, i.e. firms are large because they are unionized. 
But one could also think about a setting where firms are unionized because they 
are large. From a theoretical point of view, this can be introduced via two channels. 
First, additional heterogeneity in production technology would yield this result. 
If unionization implies larger fixed costs, more productive firms can benefit from 
economics of scale effects. Second, similar effects arise if collective bargaining is 
also costly for the union. Also in that case unions would target larger firms first.
Another, extension would model the wage setting in the non-union regime 
explicitly. As discussed before, this would introduce unemployment into the 
model and opens thus a new set of interesting implications such as the effects 
of unemployment benefits on unemployment and collective bargaining coverage. 
Furthermore, within a dynamic framework, one could study the adjustment path 
to exogenous shocks. The presumption is that the endogenous selection of wage 
regimes add an additional margin for the adjustment of economies to economic 
shocks. Therefore, different wage regimes could yield different adjustment paths 
in this setting. Finally, one of the big advantages of using collective agreements 
to study the process of wage formation is that there exist data. Therefore, 
different hypotheses can be tested against each other. We can thus conclude 
that studying the endogenous choice between different wage bargaining regimes 
in a framework with different structures of transaction costs is a fruitful area for 
future research.
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Appendix
2.A Detailed derivations of Section 2.3
Demand. The production function of the competitive homogeneous final output 
good follows 
  (2.36)
For each variety, the representative final output producer maximizes
  (2.37)
subject to (2.36) . The first order condition, ∂πQ / ∂qk = 0 implies
  (2.38)
where expenditure on the final output is defined as E = PQ. Inserting (2.38) into 
(2.36) yields the aggregate price index
  
  (2.39)
Optimal pricing. Any firm i maximizes its profits
  (2.40) 
subject to ∂pi(qi)∂qi
qi
pi(qi)
= − 1
σ . The first order condition, ∂πi (qi) / ∂qi = 0, implies
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πi (qi) = pi (qi) qi − ci (qi/φ)− Pfi,
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  (2.41)
Firm profits. Given optimal pricing in (2.5), we can rewrite firm profits as
  (2.42)
Using the demand equation in (2.2) gives pi (qi) qi = PQM
(
pi
P
)1−σ
, and therefore 
firm profits become
  (2.43)
Union wage bargaining. The bargained wage maximizes 
  (2.44)
subject to
  (2.45)
and
  (2.46)
Therefore, the first order condition subject to U  implies
  (2.47)
Using (2.45) and (2.46) we can write the two elasticities as 
  (2.48)
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,
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and
  (2.49)
Plugging (2.48) and (2.49) into (2.47) we find after some rearrangements
  (2.50)
2.B Detailed derivations of Section 2.4
2.B.1 Product market equilibrium
System of equations. The system of equations specified in Definition 1 reads
  (2.51)
  (2.52)
  (2.53)
  (2.54)
  (2.55)
  (2.56)
  (2.57)
  (2.58)
  (2.59)
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Solution. Combining (2.59) and (2.60) gives
  (2.61)
Solving (2.58) for pU /P and plugging in (2.61) gives
  (2.62)
Comining (2.56) and (2.57), we can also solve for pU  / P  in terms of exogenous 
terms, such that
  (2.63)
Combining (2.62) and (2.63) gives the closed form partial equilibrium solution 
  (2.64)
2.B.2 Endogeneizing the fallback wage
The fallback wage is given by
  (2.65)
where
  (2.66)
The wage N  can be expressed in terms of ˜  by combining (2.55), (2.56), (2.57) 
and (2.61)
  (2.67)
Plugging (2.57), (2.66) and (2.67) into (2.65) and solving for ˜  gives
  (2.68)
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.
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Solution with endogeneous fallback wage. Therefore, the solution to this 
system is the tuple {μU , pU / P} , which solves (2.62) and (2.63) subject to (2.68)
2.B.3 Endogeneizing the employment share
Combining (2.58), (2.59) and (2.60) we can write real expenditures and prices in 
terms of μU  such that
  (2.69)
  (2.70)
  (2.71)
Total labor employed follows the accounting condition
  (2.72) 
Using (2.51), (2.52), (2.53), (2.54), (2.70), and (2.71) in (2.72) gives
  (2.73)
The employment share is therefore
  (2.74)
Solution with endogenous employment share. The solution is the tuple {μU ,  pU  / P} , 
which solves (2.62) and (2.63) subject to (2.68) and (2.74).
2.C Detailed derivations of Section 2.5
Applying the last equation. In general equilibrium the the wage in the non-
unionized sector is such that the labor market is cleared, i.e.
  (2.75)
E
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L = N.
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Therefore, the employment share is equal to one, χ = 1, and by (2.68) the fallback 
wage becomes
  (2.76)
Solution. The solution is the tuple {μU , pU /P} , which solves (2.62) and 
(2.63) subject to (2.76).
Proofs of uniqueness and exisitence. In Scenario 1 ( fN > fU  and  bN <  bU ) an 
equilibrium exists an is unique if (i) Eq.1 is strictly decreasing (ii) Eq.2 is strictly 
increasing, (iii) Eq.1 is larger than Eq.2 evaluated at μU = 0 and (iv) the pole point 
is before the threshold.
It is easily established that the slopes of the two equations follow ∂pU/P∂μU |Eq.1 < 0.
and
y
∂pU/P
∂μU
|Eq.2 > 0 . The third condition requires that pUP |Eq.1,μU=0 > pUP |Eq.2,μU=0
implying that
  (2.77)
needs to holds. For the fourth condition we need to find a firm share for which 
the denominator in (2.76) equates to zero. This is the case for a μ0U which solves 
μ0U
1−μ0U
= 1
θ−1
(
fN
fU
) σ
σ−1 − θ
θ−1
(
fN
fU
)
. Therefore, 0 < μ0U < 1 holds if
  (2.78)
Therefore, combining the conditions (2.77) and (2.78) gives
 
For Scenario 2 (fN < fU and bN > bU ) the proof follows almost along the same 
lines. An equilibrium exists and is unique if (i) Eq.1 is strictly decreasing (ii) Eq.2 
is strictly increasing, (iii) Eq.1 smaller than Eq.2 evaluated at μU = 0 and (iv) Eq.1 
larger than Eq.2 evaluated at μU  = 1. Again it is easy to verify that
∂pU/P
∂μU
|Eq.1 > 0
|and ∂pU/P∂μU |Eq.2 < 0. The third condition requires
pU
P
|Eq.1,μU=0 < pUP |Eq.2,μU=0
which is equivalent to
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.
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  (2.79)
The fourth condition
pU
P
|Eq.1,μU=1 > pUP |Eq.2,μU=1 is always fullfilled because 
it evaluates to 1 > 0. Rearranging condition (2.79) gives again.
(
fN
fU
) 1
σ−1
− θ > σ
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.
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σ
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θ
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fN
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) 1
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Introduction
3.1 Introduction
Wage inequality has increased strongly in most OECD countries in recent decades 
(OECD, 2011).1
Much of the increase has taken place within worker groups defined by education, 
age, or experience, and is therefore of the residual type. Globalization, technological 
change, and institutional reforms are often cited as the determinants of this evolution. 
In this paper, we shed light on the importance of the international activities of 
firms and how these interact with collective bargaining in shaping the distribution 
of residual wages across workers. Germany is an ideal laboratory for this exercise 
because it is Europe’s largest economy, a major exporting nation, and it has seen 
a strong increase in wage inequality in recent decades.2 The international activities 
of firms can affect the wage distribution via various channels. The channel most 
relevant for our study is rent-sharing between firms and workers. If international 
activities affect rents, and if firms and workers bargain about the distribution of these 
rents, exporting or outsourcing can affect wages. Recent theoretical contributions 
based on Melitz (2003) have shown that different firms are affected differently by 
trade liberalization, with lower trade costs typically resulting in a more unequal 
distribution of ex post profits (quasi-rents). In the presence of rent-sharing, greater 
variation across firms in terms of rents yields greater variation in terms of wages.
In this paper, we use German linked employer-employee data to investigate 
how the international activities of firms affect rent-sharing and wages in the 
presence of different bargaining regimes.3 In Germany, as in other countries, 
collective agreements (CAs) – whether conducted at the plant level or at the 
industry level – still play an important role in the wage determination process.4 
Our wage data on German manufacturing industries between 1996 and 2007 are 
well suited for our purposes because these data contain information on the export 
participation and the type of bargaining regime.
1 This chapter is joint work together with Gabriel Felbermayr (Ifo Institute Munich) and Hans-Jörg Schmerer (IAB 
Nuremberg), compare Felbermayr, Hauptmann, and Schmerer (2014).
2 Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Schönberg (2009) have documented the evidence for Germany. They have found that 
at least two-thirds of the increase in inequality between 1974 and 2004 is the result of a rise in within-group 
inequality. 
3 In the remainder of this paper, the terms “firm” and “plant” are used interchangeably, because the majority of 
plants in our empirical analysis are single unit firms.
4 For a description of the German system of labor relations, see Keller and Kirsch (2010). Addison, Bryson, 
Teixeira, Pahnke, and Bellmann (2010); Addison, Teixeira, Bryson, and Pahnke (2011) have provided a 
descriptive overview of the structure and developments in the German collective bargaining system. We 
expect that plants covered by plant-level agreements can more easily respond to local changes. For Germany, 
Gürtzgen (2009b) has found that wages in plants covered by firm-level agreements are positively associated 
with quasi-rents, which is an indication of rent-sharing. In addition, Gürtzgen (2009a) has shown that wages 
are lower in industries characterized by stronger plant-heterogeneity if wages are bargained at the industry 
level.
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In our empirical exercise, we study a theoretical mechanism recently put forward 
by Egger and Etzel (2012), who have combined endogenous markups and collective 
bargaining. They have shown that exporting might lead to lower wages. While 
firms in more productive industries always pay higher wages, exporting lowers 
per worker profits because mark-ups on foreign markets are smaller than those 
on domestic markets and exporting increases the labor demand elasticity. Hence, 
unions are more cautious about the negative employment effects and moderate 
their wage demand. This wage-reducing competition effect dominates the more 
standard wageenhancing scale effect resulting from the export-driven increase in 
firms’ profits and output. Egger and Etzel (2012) extended their model to centralized 
bargaining at the industry level, which yields qualitatively similar results.5
Clearly, rent-sharing on the firm level can arise for alternative reasons, such 
as fair wage concerns or convex adjustment costs. Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) 
have modeled residual wage inequality in a Melitz (2003) constant markup 
framework with fair wages. They have shown that exporters pay a wage premium 
and lower trade costs increase inequality. Cosar, Guner, and Tybout (2011) have 
used a search-and-matching framework with convex adjustment costs. In their 
model, individual bargaining yields residual inequality because expanding firms 
are more strongly constrained as a result of convex recruitment costs, and thus 
face higher rents.6 Fair wage preferences or convex adjustment costs are not 
directly observable in the data, whereas collective bargaining coverage is.
To explore the role of rent-sharing, we propose a plant-level profitability 
proxy that is free from composition effects. Using spell fixed-effects to control 
for unobserved workplace characteristics, our Mincerian wage regressions show 
that wages are higher in more profitable plants; this holds, regardless of whether 
a firm is covered by collective bargaining. However, only in the subsample of 
plants under collective bargaining do we find that the export exposure of a plant 
negatively affects the extent of rent-sharing. This result is consistent with the 
argument of Egger and Etzel (2012). At average profitability, the wage premium 
paid by a firm achieving 40 percent of its sales in foreign markets versus a purely 
domestic firm is close to zero. The exporter wage premium is substantial (about 
3.9 percent) in plants with profitability levels that are two standard deviations 
below the mean, but it becomes negative (-2.5 percent) for plants that are two 
standard deviations above the mean. 
5 Montagna and Nocco (2013) have introduced collective bargaining into the heterogeneous mark-up framework 
of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and have come to the same conclusions as Egger and Etzel (2012).
6 Interestingly, with constant mark-ups and linear adjustment costs, collective bargaining does not lead to wage 
dispersion, because firm-level productivity differences are completely absorbed by employment adjustment (see 
Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding, 2010; Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer, 2011).
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While the existence of the exporter wage premium is well documented in the 
literature,7 our focus is on the interaction between rent-sharing, collective 
bargaining, and export behavior, which has not yet received much attention. 
Comfortingly, however, our analysis reveals an unconditional positive correlation 
between wages and exports at the plant level. Yet, controlling for observed 
and unobserved worker and workplace characteristics, the (residual) exporter 
wage premium decreases significantly (see also Schank, Schnabel, and Wagner 
(2007). This indicates that the positive premium is largely driven by assortative 
matching.8 Hence, differences in wages are at least partly driven by differences 
in workforce characteristics.9 Furthermore, Klein, Moser, and Urban (2010) have 
provided evidence of the existence of a negative exporter wage premium for 
low-skilled workers for Germany. Based on the same data, Schmillen (2011) has 
demonstrated that the exporter wage premium only shows up in plants that 
export to more remote markets.
In the following section, we discuss the data used for our empirical analysis. 
In Section 3.3 we outline the empirical strategy, and in Section 3.4 we present the 
estimation results. In Section 3.5, we offer some concluding remarks.
3.2 Data
Matched employer–employee data for Germany. Our study is based on matched 
employer–employee data for Germany, which is provided in the LIAB dataset – 
the linked employer–employee data from the Institute for Employment Research 
(IAB).10 We focus on the manufacturing sector for the years 1996–2007, which 
allows us to include all German regions.11 The core of this dataset is the IAB 
establishment panel, an annual survey conducted by the IAB in Nuremberg. Using 
a common plant identifier, administrative worker-level information from the 
German Federal Employment agency is matched to the survey.12
7 See the leading work by Bernard, Jensen, and Lawrence (1995) and the studies surveyed by Schank, Schnabel, 
and Wagner (2007) or Wagner (2012).
8 Differences in the workforce composition are also in line with the models of, for example, Helpman, Itskhoki, and 
Redding (2010), Davidson, Matusz, and Shevchenko (2008), or Yeaple (2005). Krishna, Poole, and Senses (2011) 
and Davidson et al. (2010) have also found empirical evidence for matching effects and sorting. In a similar 
context, Krishna, Poole, and Senses (2011) have shown, for Brazil, that the impact of trade openness on wages 
becomes insignificant if match effects are simultaneously considered.
9 Frias, Kaplan, and Verhoogen (2012) have presented evidence for the exporter wage premium using Mexican 
data. Baumgarten (2010) has investigated the implications of exports and worker characteristics on wage 
inequality in Germany.
10 Alda, Bender, and Gartner (2005) have provided an overview of these data.
11 East German plants were not covered in the waves 1993–1995.
12 The data can be accessed freely at the data research centre at the IAB.
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IAB establishment panel. The IAB establishment survey applies very high-
quality standards. Data are collected in face-to-face interviews by TNS Infratest, 
a renowned market research unit in Germany. The response rate lies between 
63  and 73 percent; this guarantees continuity in the sample because plants 
are repeatedly interviewed over time.13 Data are checked and cross-checked for 
consistency, based on the answers given in previous years. Inconsistent answers 
are validated in an additional telephone interview held with the respective 
establishment’s interviewee. The advantage of the IAB panel over official registry 
data is that it contains information about a plant’s global stance and details 
regarding its industrial labor relations. In particular, plants are asked about how 
their employees are organized, including detailed information about the role of 
trade unions and CAs.
The sampling strategy is such that, within appropriately defined sample cells, 
plants are drawn randomly to ensure representativeness.14 The number of draws is 
set to ensure, within each cell, the feasibility of statistical inference. Cells (strata) 
are defined by region, industry, and size class. This might lead to oversampling of 
large firms relative to the universe of firms, in particular in the service industry 
(where small firms are common). For this reason, we exclude the services sector 
in our analysis. For the purpose of obtaining representative descriptive statistics, 
the LIAB provides appropriate weights. In econometric analysis, the peculiarities 
of the sampling process are best dealt with by controlling for the strata variables, 
which are plant size, region, and industry (Fischer, Janik, Müller, and Schmucker, 
2008).
Worker-level data. The data for individual employees cover all workers, subject to 
social-security contributions. This amounts to about 80 percent of German workers 
(excluding the self-employed, civil servants, workers in marginal employment, and 
family workers). The data also contain detailed information on several individual 
characteristics, such as age, gender, nationality, tenure, and wage compensation. 
It is compulsory for plants to report these data at the end of each year, and at the 
beginning and end of each employment spell. In our analysis, we focus on full-
time employees only, because wages are average gross daily wages without any 
information on working hours. Therefore, we exclude all observations for part-time 
workers, apprentices, interns, and persons working at home. Because the real gross 
daily wage will be of particular interest, we also have to deal with an additional 
13 The response rate of continuing establishments is stable at 81–84 percent.
14 Fischer, Janik, Müller, and Schmucker (2009) have provided a detailed discussion about the sampling methods.
69Chapter 3
Data
issue.15 Because of a reporting ceiling in the German social-security system, wages 
are right-censored at the contribution limit. As usual, we use Tobit regressions to 
impute wages above the cut-off level (Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Schönberg, 2009). 
For each year, we run a separate regression using age, age squared, tenure, tenure 
squared, gender, and foreign nationality, as well as a full set of industry dummies 
as controls. The censored daily wages are replaced by predicted values obtained 
from the Tobit regression (for details, see Gartner, 2005). We use industry-level 
price deflators from the OECD in order to deflate all Euro values.
Measuring international activity. At the plant-level, our data comprise 
information about the export intensity of the plant, measured as the share of sales 
obtained in export markets. Unfortunately, we cannot address outsourcing directly 
at the plant level because of missing information about imported intermediates. 
Moreover, there is no information available about the export destination. We 
interpret exporting as a valid measure of a plant’s broader international activities, 
which also include importing. This is in line with recent evidence (see Kasahara 
and Lapham, 2013). Anecdotal evidence suggests that exporting plants might find 
it easier to outsource parts of production through foreign affiliates. In addition to 
the plant-level information about exports, we also use an industry-level openness 
measure taken from the OECD in order to tie our analysis closer to that of Egger 
and Etzel (2012).16
Collective bargaining. Collective agreements are still widely applied and 
predominantly conducted at the industry or regional level, as well as at the plant 
or firm level. These agreements constitute a legally binding wage floor between 
the two bargaining parties. Moreover, firms normally extend this agreement to 
all workers, even to non-members. Therefore, for our purposes, the bargaining 
coverage is a better indicator than union density. Figure 3.1 shows that, although 
declining over time, in 2007, about 70 percent of all employees in German 
manufacturing were still covered by CAs.
15 Please note that, because of some reporting inconsistencies by the employer, educational attainment has been 
adjusted following Fitzenberger, Osikominu, and Völter (2006).
16 Our preferred measure is the world market share by industry reported in the OECD Structural Analysis (STAN) 
database.
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Figure 3.1: CA coverage, German manufacturing 1996–2007
3.3 Empirical strategy
Main regression set-up. To shed light on the interaction between rent-sharing 
and the international activities of the plant, we estimate
  (3.1)
where the index j (i ) identifies the plant at which worker i is employed at time  t. 
The dependent variable is the imputed log wage, ln it , observed for worker i at 
time t. As variables of interest, we include the plant’s export share EXP , to proxy 
exposure to international competition, and total factor productivity (TFP ), to 
proxy its profitability. From a theoretical point of view, rent-sharing is directly 
linked to productivity through the positive productivity/profits relationship.17
Besides the identification of the exporter wage-premium and the magnitude 
of rent-sharing between plants and workers, our focus is also on the interaction 
between them. We include vectors of worker and plant characteristics, Zit 
and Zj(i)t , respectively, to purge the wage data from observable worker and 
plant heterogeneity. More precisely, the vector Zit includes controls for worker 
17 This standard outcome of heterogeneous firm models as in Melitz (2003) can translate into a positive 
productivity/wage relationship (see Egger and Kreickemeier, 2009).
lnwit = γ lnTFPj(i)t + ξEXPj(i)t + κ lnTFPj(i)t × EXPj(i)t
+α′1Zit + α
′
2Zj(i)t + νt + θi × φj(i) + υit,
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characteristics, such as tenure, age, tenure squared, age squared, a white-collar 
dummy, and the level of skill attained by the respective employee. Unobservable 
differences in skill or ability are controlled for by including spell fixed-effects 
θi ×  φj (i ) . At the plant level, the vector Zj(i )t includes controls such as log-
employment to capture plant size, capital intensity measuring the relative 
capital to labor ratio on the plant level, the shares of females and part-timers, 
and variables indicating whether a plant is covered by a collective agrement at 
the plant or industry level, and whether it has a work council. Industry, time, and 
region dummies are included in all regressions.
In a first step, we compare ordinary least-squares (OLS) and spell fixed- 
effects regressions, based on the whole set of observations. Coefficients in the 
spell fixed-effects regressions are identified using the within-variation in a 
certain plant–worker combination. A spell ends either because of the successful 
switch of a worker from one to another plant, or because of a layoff. Spell fixed- 
effects are preferred over person fixed-effects as long as the decomposition of 
the time-invariant effect into its worker- and plant-specific component is not a 
separate object of interest. Also, there is the advantage that the identification is 
independent of the number of movers. Standard errors are clustered at the plant 
level. For the main part of the analysis, we also report random-effects regression 
results. Random effects have the advantage that identification relies on both the 
within- and between-variation of the data, which is important for our analysis 
because the export intensity displays relatively little variation over time.
Measuring plant-level profitability. As argued in the introduction, we are mainly 
interested in rent-sharing between employers and workers, and to what extent 
the rent-sharing intensity hinges on the export behavior of the plant. For this 
purpose, we need a plant-level profitability measure that is not plagued by 
workforce composition. Our preferred proxy is total factor productivity (TFP), 
which we construct as the residual obtained from estimating firm-level production 
functions. The TFP measure is superior to alternative proxies, such as reported 
profits, because it allows us to account for possible endogeneity problems arising 
from unobserved productivity shocks and for assortative matching.
The endogeneity issue is addressed using the semiparametric approach 
proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), who have suggested the use of 
intermediate inputs as proxies for unobserved productivity shocks.
Assortative matching poses a more complex problem. Without accounting for 
work-force composition, we would interpret a link between profitability and wages 
as rent-sharing, while the relationship might simply be the result of more efficient 
plants hiring more productive workers. In the following, we briefly describe how 
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to deal with this problem.18 We deviate from the standard production function 
framework used in the empirical body of literature by differentiating between 
different worker types within firms. For this purpose, we write the firm-specific 
composite labor input as a constant elasticity of substitution aggregate over 
workers’ human capital within the firm. Following Iranzo, Schivardi, and Tosetti 
(2008), we compute an index of worker-level human capital based on a Mincer 
wage regression.19 The index combines the measured contribution of observed 
human capital characteristics (age, experience, etc.) to the marginal product of 
labor (the wage rate) and a time-invariant component as captured by a worker 
fixed effect.
Substituting into a Cobb-Douglas production function, and taking a second- 
order Taylor series expansion, we obtain a log-linear representation that can be 
estimated using the method of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). To estimate the TFP, 
we need measures for capital stocks. These are constructed following Müller (2008, 
2010) who has suggested a perpetual inventory method that exploits the detailed 
information about a plant’s investments in order to generate capital stocks.20
Our production function estimates imply reasonable coefficients for capital 
between 0.2 and 0.4, and for labor between 0.7 and 0.75. Differentiating between 
exporter and non-exporter plants does not point towards important differences 
between these two groups.21 Comparing the standard Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003) productivity measure and the skill-free Iranzo, Schivardi, and Tosetti 
(2008) productivity measure for the years 1996, 2002, and 2007, it emerges 
that exporters have, on average, higher levels of productivity.22 Moreover, the 
gap between exporting and non-exporting plants is smaller when controlling 
for work-force composition. However, the gap between non-exporter and 
exporter productivity increases over time and across different percentiles of 
the productivity distribution. This productivity gap between exporters and non-
exporters decreases by 3–6 percent, on average, when controlling for work-force 
composition.23
18 In the Appendix, we provide details about the employed methodology (see Appendix 3.A).
19 See Table 3.A.1 in the Appendix for the results.
20 Plants in the sample report investment volumes and type of investment, which makes it possible to proxy the 
capital stock by summing per-period investments and taking investmentspecific depreciation rates into account.
21 Table 3.A.2 in the Appendix reports detailed results.
22 See Table 3.B.2 in the Appendix. The kernel density plots on the productivity distribution, reported in Figure 3.B.1 
of the Appendix reveal the well-known stylized fact that exporting plants are more productive.
23 Following Del Gatto, Ottaviano, and Pagnini (2008), we also test whether TFP is Pareto-distributed. However, the 
estimated shape parameter is at a rather low k = 1.14 and R2 is lower than the proposed threshold reported in 
Del Gatto, Ottaviano, and Pagnini (2008). See Table 3.B.3 in the Appendix for details.
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3.4 Regression results
Exporter wage premium and rent-sharing: direct effects. In a first step, we 
confirm that our data reproduce well-documented stylized facts from the 
literature (see Table 3.C.1 in the Appendix). In particular, using OLS on equation 
(3.1) without the interaction term, we find that plants more strongly exposed to 
trade pay higher wages. An increase in the export share by 10 percentage points 
is associated with an average increase of the wage rate by 0.43  percent. The 
magnitude of this effect is comparable to previous findings (see Schank, Schnabel, 
and Wagner, 2007). Profitability (measured by lnTFP) is also positively related to 
wages. Ceteris paribus, a 10 percent increase in TFP leads to a 0.25  percent wage 
increase, on average. The statistical significance and quantitative importance of 
these variables does not depend on whether or not they are entered simultaneously 
into the regression. However, it appears that the use of spell fixed-effects reduces 
the coefficient on the export share to zero, but leaves the one on TFP statistically 
significant and positive, although approximately halved.24 We show that our main 
results hold regardless of whether spell fixed-effects are used or not.
Exporter wage premium and rent-Sharing: interactions. Table 3.1 presents our 
core result. Based on Egger and Etzel (2012), the conjecture is that rent-sharing 
(i.e., the effect of profitability on wages) is less pronounced in firms that are more 
strongly exposed to international markets. To test this link between the export 
status of the establishment and its profitability (TFP), we include the interaction 
between both variables. We expect both TFP and the exporter variable to have 
positive coefficients, but we expect the interaction to have a negative coefficient. 
The implication of this, of course, is that the exporter wage premium is smaller in 
more profitable firms (where wages are pushed up directly by higher TFP).
Columns (1) and (2) investigate the role of plant-level openness to trade, while 
Columns (3) and (4) consider industry-level openness in order to nudge our analysis 
closer to the theoretical model of Egger and Etzel (2012). We focus first on Columns 
(1) and (2). Interestingly, allowing for the interaction between TFP and export share, 
even in the presence of spell fixed-effects, both the profitability measure and the 
export share have positive signs and are statistically different from zero at the 1 
percent level. The coefficient on the interaction term is negative in sign and is also 
significant at the 1 percent level. All estimates are algebraically smaller under the 
spell fixed-effects specification. The results provide evidence for an exporter wage 
24 Taking the Melitz (2003) model literally, exporting is directly related to productivity, making simultaneous 
inference on either difficult. The correlation between the two measures is 0.2599, meaning that collinearity is 
not a severe problem in our regressions.
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premium and for rent-sharing. However, the importance of rent-sharing declines in 
the export share of the firm: the elasticity of TFP on the wage is 0.029 in a purely 
domestic firm, but only 0.017 in a firm with an average export share (0.41). The 
elasticity is zero in a firm that exports all of its output. The exporter wage premium 
also declines with TFP: the wage paid by an average exporter is about 0.13 percent 
higher than that paid by an average domestic firm.25 If a firm with an average export 
share has a level of TFP two standard deviations above the mean, it pays a wage that 
is 1.9 percent lower than a purely domestic firm.26 However, if a firm has a level of TFP 
two standard deviations below the mean, it pays a wage 2.14 percent higher than a 
purely domestic firm.27 A firm exporting its entire output with an average level of TFP 
has a wage rate about 0.31 percent higher than a similarly profitably purely domestic 
firm.28 Please note that these interpretations of our findings make a ceteris paribus 
assumption. In reality, we know that profitability and export status are positively 
correlated (see footnote 25), which means that some caution is warranted.
Table 3.1: The export wage-premium and the role of TFP
Dependent variable: Logarithm of individual daily wage
(1) 
OLS
(2)
Spell FE
(3) 
OLS
(4)
Spell FE
TFP (ln) 0.071*** 0.029*** 0.108*** 0.053**
(0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.021)
Exports (share) 0.785*** 0.243∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.074)
Exports × TFP –0.089***
(0.013)
–0.029***
(0.009)
Openness 0.056***
(0.018)
0.033
(0.021)
Openness × TFP –0.005***
(0.001)
–0.002**
(0.001)
R 2
Plants
Observations
0.623
5,040
4,658,595
0.181
5,040
4,658,595
0.622
5,003
4,654,547
0.188
5,003
4,654,547
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the plant level in (1)-(2) and at the industry level in (3)-(4). 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Controls included but not 
reported are age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, medium-, high-skill and white-collar dummies, 
plant size, capital intensity, the share of females and part timers and dummies for the existence of a 
worker council and collective agreements at the firm or industry level. Additionally, all estimations include 
a full set of region, sector, and time dummies. Total factor productivity (TFP) is constructed following 
Iranzo, Schivardi, and Tosetti (2008). We apply the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method to control for 
unobserved productivity shocks. See Table 3.D.1 in the Appendix for complete results.
25 100% × (0.243 × 0.410 – 0.029 × 8.271 × 0.410) = 0.129%.
26 100% × (0.243 × 0.410 – 0.029 × (8.271 + 2 × 0.845) × 0.410) = –1.881%.
27 100% × (0.243 × 0.410 – 0.029 × (8.275 – 2 × 0.845) × 0.410) = 2.138%.
28 100% × (0.243 – 0.029 × 8.271) = 0.314%.
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Columns (3) and (4) replace the firm-level export share measure with an industry-
level variable in order to tie our empirics closer to that of Egger and Etzel (2012). 
These regressions confirm that wages in more open industries tend to be higher. 
Moreover, at the plant level, we also find that the magnitude of rent-sharing 
tends to be more pronounced in industries that are less open. As a general lesson, 
because of rent-sharing, it is profitable for a worker to be employed in a highly 
productive firm; if that firm exports, rent appropriation becomes more difficult 
for workers.
The role of collective bargaining. There is a positive link between the distribution 
of wages and the distribution of firm-level profits in theoretical models featuring 
fair wages (Egger and Kreickemeier, 2009) or search-and-matching with 
convex adjustment costs (Cosar, Guner, and Tybout, 2011), as well as in models 
featuring collective bargaining. In this section, we test whether the form of wage 
determination matters for the existence of an exporter wage premium and for the 
role of internationalization on rent-sharing. 
Table 3.2 reports coefficients obtained from regressions either including 
observations for plants without collective bargaining in Columns (1)–(3), or plants 
subject to plant- or centralized-bargaining agreements in Columns (4)–(6). The 
upper panel employs the information in the plant-level export share, whereas the 
lower panel exploits industry-level data as a globalization proxy. We compare 
pooled OLS, spell fixed-effects, and spell random-effects estimators. Both regimes 
are comparable because the same number of plants is included in both regressions.29
Whether wages are bargained collectively or not, we find that more profitable 
plants pay higher wages. The magnitude of the direct effect is very similar across 
regressions using plants without or with collective bargaining coverage. Strikingly, 
however, a direct positive exporter wage premium exists only in the sample of 
collectively bargained plants. In this sample, we also find that rent-sharing is reduced 
by international activities. Plants not covered by collective bargaining feature an 
inconsistent and statistically insignificant sign pattern on the export variables. This 
picture is robust to using an industry-level openness measure instead of the plant-
level export share; see the lower panel of Table 3.2. The results suggest that the 
pattern in the data is best understood against the background of the model by Egger 
and Etzel (2012), where collective bargaining and variable mark-ups interact to give 
rise to a negative interaction between exporting and rent-sharing.
29 Although we have different numbers of observations, the results are comparable because we cluster standard 
errors on the plant level.
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Table 3.2: Role of collective agreements
Dependent variable: Logarithm of individual daily wage
No collective agreement Collective agreement
OLS Spell FE Spell RE OLS Spell FE Spell RE
Plant level
TFP (ln) 0.083***
(0.010)
0.031***
(0.010)
0.045**
(0.010)
0.066***
(0.008)
0.028***
(0.008)
0.041*** 
(0.007)
Exports (share) 0.287
(0.207)
–0.100
(0.183)
0.018
(0.164)
0.726***
(0.124)
0.244***
(0.088)
0.423***
(0.079)
Exports × TFP –0.037
(0.026)
0.008
(0.023)
–0.004
(0.020)
–0.081***
(0.015)
–0.029***
(0.011)
–0.049***
(0.009)
R2
Plants
Observations
0.590
2,626
491,828
0.126
2,626
491,828
2,626
491,828
0.597
3,302
4,166,767
0.192
3,302
4,166,767
3,302
4,166,767
Industry level
TFP (ln) 0.101***
(0.027)
0.058
(0.044)
0.078**
(0.039)
0.104***
(0.013)
0.050**
(0.020)
0.073***
(0.014)
Openness 0.053
(0.037)
0.048
(0.042)
0.055
(0.040)
0.052**
(0.018)
0.030
(0.020)
0.039**
(0.018)
Openness × TFP –0.003
(0.002)
–0.002
(0.003)
–0.003
(0.003)
–0.005***
(0.001)
–0.002**
(0.001)
–0.004***
(0.001)
R2 0.592 0.152 0.596 0.196
Plants
Observations
2,594
489,410
2,594
489,410
2,594
489,410
3,284
4,165,137
3,284
4,165,137
3,284
4,165,137
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the plant-level in the upper panel and the industry-level in 
the lower panel. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Controls 
included but not reported are age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, medium-, high-skill and white-
collar dummies, plant size, capital intensity, the share of females and part timers and a dummy for the 
existence of a worker council. Additionally, all estimations include a full set of region, sector, and time 
dummies. Total factor productivity (TFP) is constructed following Iranzo, Schivardi, and Tosetti (2008). 
We apply the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method to control for unobserved productivity shocks. See 
Tables  3.D.2 and 3.D.3 in the Appendix for complete results.
The right-most column in the upper panel of Table 3.2 suggests that, at average 
profitability, the wage premium paid by a firm achieving 40 percent of its sales 
on foreign markets over a purely domestic firm is close to zero. The exporter wage 
premium is substantial (about 3.9 percent) in plants with profitability levels two 
standard deviations below the mean, while it becomes negative (-2.5 percent) for 
plants two standard deviations above the mean. 
Does more exposure to trade reduce wages? One direct test of whether 
globalization reduces rent-sharing between plants and workers under collective 
bargaining is to look at changes in wages and plant-level trade exposure.30 
30 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this test.
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However, inference is impaired by the fact that export status does not change or 
does not change significantly for a substantial fraction of firms. For this reason, 
we use a sample of plants that switch their export status at least once in the entire 
period.31 Table 3.3 reports estimation results for regressions where we regress the 
change in wages on the change in exports. Moreover, we also distinguish between 
blue- and white-collar workers in order to shed light on the role of skills. All other 
controls, except for the time, sector, and region dummies, also enter the regression 
in first differences.32
Table 3.3: Does more export reduce wages?
Dependent variable: Logarithm of individual daily (first differences)
Collective agreements
No CA CA No CA CA CA CA
BC and/or WC workers All All All All BC WC
Exports (dummy, first diff.) 0.007** 
(0.003)
–0.006*
(0.003)
Export (share, first diff.) 0.002
(0.014)
–0.018*** 
(0.007)
–0.020**
(0.008)
–0.013**
(0.006)
R2
Plants
Observations
0.087
807
113,854
0.053
864
747,981
0.086
807
113,854
0.053
864
747,981
0.075
846
484,942
0.034
813
263,039
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the plant level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, 
and 10 percent levels, respectively. All estimations include a full set of region, sector, and time dummies. 
Constant estimated but not reported. All variables are in first differences. The sample only includes plants 
that switch their export status at least once during the entire period. Column (1) estimates the change of 
wages on the change of export dummy for non collective agreement plants. Column (2) includes collective 
agreement plants only. Columns (3) to (4) replicates columns (1) and (2) including the export share. 
Columns (5) to (6) replicates column (4) but for blue collar (BC) and white collar workers (WC) separately.
Columns (1) and (2) differentiate between those firms that are not covered by 
collective bargaining and those that are. The hypothesis is that wages in the former 
group should not be affected by exporting behavior, while those in the latter group 
should be affected negatively. When looking at the exporter dummy variable, we 
find that, under collective bargaining, exporting does indeed depress wages. In the 
absence of collective bargaining, the opposite effect is seen. However, this finding 
is not robust to using the export share instead of the dummy; see Columns (3) and 
(4). An increase in the export share has zero effects on wages in non-collective 
bargaining plants but significantly reduces the wages of workers employed in 
31 Thus, the sample of plants is slightly different from the sample used in the earlier analysis. 
32 Some variables do not change over time and are thus excluded. Table 3.D.4 in the Appendix provides details. 
Capital intensity is excluded in order to maximize the number of observations. 
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collective bargaining plants. This confirms the results of Egger and Etzel (2012) 
and Montagna and Nocco (2013). 
Columns (5) and (6) rerun the regression reported in Column (4), but for blue- 
and white-collar workers separately. The effect is much smaller for white-collar 
workers compared to blue-collar workers. In line with the discussion about rising 
wages at the top, but declining wages at the bottom of the income distribution, we 
find that this negative coefficient seems to be driven by a reduction in blue-collar 
wages. This is consistent with the fact that collective bargaining is more prevalent 
for blue-collar workers. To the extent that worker-level wage innovations do not 
correlate with firm-level export variables, Table 3.3 allows a causal interpretation of 
the export intensity to wage moderation hypothesis tested in this paper. However, 
the results in Table 3.3 also reveal that the effect is small in magnitude.
Can we interpret our results as causal? In equation (3.1), our key identification 
assumption is that TFP and the export share are both uncorrelated to the error term 
υit. While we have no reason to believe that the correlation is exactly zero, we can 
argue that, in practice, it is very small. This is because the TFP and export share 
variables vary at the firm level and not at the worker level: individual worker-level 
shocks are therefore unlikely to cause firm-level behavior.33 TFP and exports can 
be driven by firm-level shocks, but the main candidates for such shocks are among 
the variables that we include in the regression: trade exposure and productivity. 
Moreover, the use of spell fixed-effects and a large array of worker characteristics 
implies that any correlation between υit and firm-level variables cannot be a 
result of observed or unobserved human capital characteristics. For example, we 
fully account for the possibility that a firm hires a better educated or more able 
work force with higher wages with the aim of starting to export.
When we condition on the bargaining regime of a firm, similar arguments 
apply. However, a number of additional observations are important. First, in 
Germany, there is no official rule forcing firms above any specific size or wage bill 
threshold to engage in collective bargaining, so there is no automatic correlation 
between TFP or export status and the bargaining regime. Second, the frequently 
cited argument that more openness leads to higher demand for insurance and, 
thus, possibly to stronger union presence, has little impact in a country that offers 
generous unemployment benefits and employment protection. Furthermore, we 
have based our point on two separate samples: one where all plants are always 
covered by collective bargaining, and the other where this is not the case. Our 
33 Unless, of course, they are correlated across workers within firms. However, this possibility is taken care of by 
including spell fixed-effects (which nest firm effects).
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results are consequently entirely driven by within-group variation within these 
samples. For these reasons, we are confident that our results are not spurious.
Further robustness checks. In the Appendix, we show that our results are robust 
across white- and blue-collar workers (Tables 3.C.2 and 3.C.3) and that they hold 
for the subsamples of firms covered by firm-level and industry-level agreements, 
respectively (Tables 3.C.4 and 3.C.5).
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we shed light on the implications of global competition for the 
wage-setting mechanism in the presence of unions. Our results suggest that the 
bargaining positions of unions are weaker in more internationally active plants. 
Our analysis is motivated by recent theoretical work, which shows that the 
combination of variable mark-ups and collective bargaining implies lower rent-
sharing in firms that achieve a higher share of their sales in exports markets, 
where profit margins are lower. 
Our preferred measure for rent-sharing is a profitability measure that is purged 
from the plant’s skill-composition. In line with the theoretical predictions outlined 
in the introduction, we are able to show that a surge in the export intensity 
of collective bargaining plants is negatively associated with wages. The well-
known exporter wage premium appears in our regressions when the identification 
is based on both the within- and the between-variation of the data, and/or if 
we explicitly allow for interactions between exports and productivity by taking 
a plant’s profitability into account. Moreover, the export share turns out to be 
significant only in plants that either bargain wages collectively or individually 
on the firm level. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to connect 
different wage-bargaining regimes to the exporter wage premium, based on 
matched employer–employee data.
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Appendix
3.A Details on the calculation of profitability measures
A generalized production function framework. Our approach is based on Iranzo, 
Schivardi, and Tosetti (2008). Using plant-level panel data, we estimate the 
following production function for plant j
   (3.2)
where the stock of capital is Kjt, the composite labor input is L˜jt, and Ajt is TFP. 
The composite labor input is constructed by using consistent estimates of workers’ 
abilities h:
  (3.3)
where Ljt  is total employment, and ρ measures the degree of substitutability across 
different human capital levels. Using a second-order Taylor series expansion of the 
production function around the plant’s mean ability we obtain 
  (3.4)
To apply linear estimation techniques, this expression can be further approximated 
as:
  (3.5)
where δ = β 12(ρ − 1).34 The average ability of the workforce, h¯jt , and the plant’s 
standard deviation in its workers’ ability, σjt , are constructed using the consistently 
estimated worker productivity measures as explained in the following section.
Olley and Pakes (1996) or Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) stress the importance 
of controlling for unobservable short-run productivity shocks when estimating 
total factor productivity. Olley and Pakes (1996) use firms’ investment as a proxy, 
whereas Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) use information about the firms’ input of 
intermediate goods to weed out the simultaneity bias caused by omitting the 
unobserved productivity shocks. The authors are able to show that the advantage 
of using intermediate inputs as proxy is that it allows to tackle another bias 
caused by zero investment flows. At each point in time, employers are more 
likely to use intermediate inputs than to invest in their capital stock. We use the 
34 The approximation makes use of ln(x+ y) = lnx+ ln(1 + y/x) and ln(1 + y/x) ≈ y/x.
Yjt = Ajt ·Kαjt · L˜βjt ,
L˜jt = Ljt ·
(
1/Ljt ·
∑Ljt
i=1
hρi
)1/ρ
,
lnYjt  α lnKjt + β lnLjt + β ln
[
h¯jt +
1
2
(ρ− 1)
(
σ2jt
h¯jt
)]
+ εjt.
lnYjt  α lnKjt + β ln
(
Ljth¯jt
)
+ δ
(
σjt
h¯jt
)2
+ εjt ,
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method suggested by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (later denoted LP) and estimate 
equation (3.5) in order to obtain ability-free estimates for our profitability proxy.
Measuring human capital. Following Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) in 
general, and Andrews, Gill, Schank, and Upward (2008) as a particular application to 
German data, we run a Mincerian wage regression to estimate worker productivity 
measures. Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) suggest that the superior 
identification strategy is “persons first and firms second”. We thus estimate
  (3.6)
where it is the imputed daily compensation of individual worker i at time t and - is the grand mean of the imputed wage rate averaged over time. Worker and 
plant characteristics are gathered in the vectors xit and yj(i)t, respectively, while θi 
and φj (i )t denote worker and plant fixed effects.
The auxiliary model in equation (3.6) differs from our main specification in 
equation (3.1) in the paper for two reasons. First of all we have to decompose the 
spell-fixed effect into its plant- and its worker component. Moreover, we also use 
a different set of control variables in order to maximize the number of movers 
in the sample. The identification of the plant fixed-effect hinges on the number 
of movers between plants. The sample size decreases rapidly in the number of 
plant-controls. The higher the total number of plants in the sample, the more 
likely it gets that plants are connected through workers switching jobs between 
two plants that are both observed in the sample. In order to reduce the number 
of plants that drop out of the sample we follow Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis 
(1999) by treating small plants as one group.
The plant dummy absorbs some of the unobserved heterogeneity on the plant-
level. Not controlling for plant fixed effects would yield a biased estimator of 
the person fixed effects including both person and establishment time-invariant 
components. As Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) demonstrate, neglecting 
the plant fixed effect would yield estimates for φj (i )t which would also include the 
“employment-duration weighted average plant effect φj ”, provided that the other 
assumptions are not violated.35
35 Andrews, Gill, Schank, and Upward (2008) use their estimation strategy and analyze the importance of a 
sufficient number of movers between employers to increase the quality of the estimated plant fixed effect. Their 
focus lies on identifying the plant fixed effects in Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999), which allows them 
to maximize the number of movers by using the full-sample of workers. Our sample is smaller and relies on 
information about the plant. We thus need matched employer-employee data, which also reduces the number 
of movers. We therefore also propose a different identification strategy which relies more on the plant-level 
information when we estimate the plant-component.
lnwit = xitη + yj(i)tμ+ θi + φj(i)t + εit ,
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The human capital index then constructed as the sum of predicted worker effects, i.e.
  (3.7)
The index thus comprises time-varying and time-constant characteristics related 
to the worker. The predicted hˆit  allows constructing the first and second moments 
of the human-capital distribution within the plant, which facilitates the estimation 
of equation (3.5).
Results for the human capital estimates. Results of the estimation of 
equation  (3.6) are reported in Table 3.A.1.36 Column 1 displays the results when only 
worker information (age, age squared and age cubed) is controlled for. Column  2 
adds the employer size and it is our preferred specification. This parsimonious 
setup is chosen to maximize the number of movers between plants. As a further 
robustness check, we include capital intensity in column 3.
Results for the production function estimates. Results of the production function 
estimation of are reported in Table 3.A.2.37 Panel A displays the results when only 
employment and capital are included. The results of estimating equation (3.5) are 
reported in panel B. Furthermore estimations are conducted for non-exporters 
and exporters separately in columns (2) and (3). The residual of the estimation in 
column (1) in panel B is our preferred TFP measure.
36 In particular we use the Stata routine felsdvreg provided by Cornelißen (2008).
37 We use the Stata routine levpet provided by Petrin, Poi, and Levinsohn (2004) for the estimation of the 
production function.
hˆit = xitηˆ + θˆi.
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Table 3.A.1: FELSDV results
Dependent variable: Logarithm of individual daily wage  
Variables of interest: Firm and person fixed effects
(1) (2) (3)
Age 0.076*** 0.075*** 0.073***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age2/100
–.084***
(0.001)
–.082***
(0.001)
–.079***
(0.001)
Age3/1000 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Employment  (ln) 0.039*** 0.034***
(0.001) (0.001)
Capital intensity (ln) 0.023***
(0.001)
Observations 10,107,425 10,107,382 7,611,812
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. Person, firm, year, and industry dummies included in all regressions. Person fixed effects 
of column (2) are used to construct human capital measures consisting of observed and unobserved 
characteristics. These human capital measures are in turn used to construct firm-level human capital 
index variables such as the mean h¯jt and the standard deviation σjt.
Table 3.A.2: Production function estimates
Dependent variable: Value added (ln)
Non-exporter Exporter
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Without controlling for workforce composition
Employment (ln) 
Capital (ln)
0.698*** 
(0.016)
0.200*** 
(0.056)
0.688*** 
(0.022) 
0.155* 
(0.088)
0.728*** 
(0.021) 
0.200* 
(0.109)
CRS-Test (p-value) [0.065] [0.093] [0.515]
Panel B: Controlling for the workforce composition
Employment × h¯jt (ln) 0.733*** 
(0.017)
0.727*** 
(0.022)
0.755*** 
(0.017)
Capital (ln) 0.189*** 0.153* 0.357*** 
(0.061) (0.091) (0.094)
VC(hjt)2 2.866*** 3.237*** 1.453
(0.948) (0.989) (1.674)
CRS-Test (p-value) [0.221] [0.214] [0.234]
Observations 20,581 9,273 11,308
Notes:  Standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. All estimations include industry and time fixed effects. Estimation method: Levinsohn and 
Petrin (2003). Standard errors are bootstrapped in columns (1)–(3). The second panel controls for the 
plant-level workforce composition by including the mean and the squared variance coefficient of the 
human capital index. Probability of the sum of parameter estimates on labor and capital to be equal to 
one in brackets.
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3.B Summary statistics
Summary statistics. Table 3.B.1 reports further information about the variables 
used in the regressions. We distinguish between individual- and establishment-
level, where variables are collapsed to the establishment-year dimension for the 
establishment-level summary reports.
Exporter vs. non-exporter. Our analysis hinges on the constructed total factor 
productivity measure which is our preferred proxy for firm profitability. Table 3.B.2 
compares the mean, the standard deviation and three different percentiles of our 
productivity measure for non-exporters and exporters in 1996, 2000, and 2007. 
For comparison in panel A the standard Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) estimator is 
used, whereas the Iranzo, Schivardi, and Tosetti (2008) estimator is displayed in 
panel B. In all cases we find that exporters are more productive.
The kernel density plot in Figure 3.B.1 also indicates that, in our sample, 
exporters are on average more productive. Moreover, the plot also reveals that 
the two distributions strongly overlap. Thus, there is no clear cutoff as predicted 
by Melitz (2003).
Figure 3.B.1: Kernel density plot of the profitability measure
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Pareto test for the TFP estimates. To test whether our TFP measure is Pareto 
distributed we follow Del Gatto, Ottaviano, and Pagnini (2008): ”Formally, consider 
a random variable X (e.g., our TFP) with observed cumulative distribution F(X). If 
the variable is distributed as a Pareto with shape parameter ks, then the OLS 
estimate of the slope parameter in the regression of ln(1 – F(X)) on ln(X) plus a 
constant is a consistent estimator of – ks and the corresponding R2 is close to 
one.” Table 3.B.3 displays the results for the pooled sample, as well as for different 
subsamples by year or industry. The R2 only rarely exceeds 0.8.
Table 3.B.1: Summary statistics
Individual level Plant level
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Individual characteristics
Daily imputed wage (ln) 4.595 0.390 4.222 0.383
Daily non-imputed wage (ln) 4.571 0.353 4.214 0.374
Female worker (dummy) 0.175 0.380 0.250 0.231
Foreign worker (dummy) 0.092 0.289 0.046 0.091
White-collar worker (dummy) 0.348 0.476 0.299 0.240
Low-skilled worker (dummy) 0.170 0.376 0.129 0.182
Medium-skilled worker (dummy) 0.703 0.457 0.790 0.201
High-skilled worker (dummy) 0.126 0.332 0.081 0.126
Age (years) 41.507 10.014 41.424 4.512
Tenure (years) 11.444 8.204 7.989 4.261
Experience (years) 17.056 8.360 14.204 4.904
Establishment characteristics
Exporting plant (dummy) 0.890 0.313 0.549 0.498
Exports (share of total sales) 0.410 0.272 0.183 0.252
TFP (ln) 8.271 0.845 7.840 0.748
Labor productivity (ln) 11.160 0.884 10.787 0.787
Employment (ln) 7.361 1.865 4.050 1.792
Value added (ln) 18.520 2.139 14.837 2.156
Capital intensity (ln) 11.389 0.931 10.646 1.271
Female workers (share) 0.206 0.153 0.269 0.212
Part-time workers (share) 0.047 0.060 0.080 0.125
CA, industry-level (dummy) 0.754 0.431 0.457 0.498
CA, firm-level (dummy) 0.141 0.348 0.093 0.290
Existence worker council (dummy) 0.933 0.250 0.465 0.499
Industry-level characteristics
Sectoral trade openness (share) 13.505 3.832 11.846 3.712
Notes:  German matched employer-employee data (LIAB), 1996-2007, manufacturing industries. All monetary 
variables are expressed in real terms using a two-digit industry value added deflator. All industry-level 
variables are taken from the OECD STAN database.
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Table 3.B.2: Total factor productivity distribution by export status
Panel A: Levinsohn and Petrin without workforce-composition controls
Mean Std. Dev. p10 p50 p90
1996
Non-exporter 74.6 53.2 27.3 63.0 142.3
Exporter 104.0 93.1 44.0 85.7 170.5
2000
Non-exporter 82.8 86.7 19.9 66.9 140.9
Exporter 103.4 89.4 31.8 86.2 176.0
2007
Non-exporter 75.4 63.6 28.4 58.0 139.3
Exporter 102.6 92.3 42.1 81.5 163.8
Panel B: Levinsohn and Petrin including workforce-composition controls
Mean Std. Dev. p10 p50 p90
1996
Non-exporter 78.3 53.2 31.4 65.9 131.9
Exporter 101.5 69.0 48.3 84.3 171.7
2000
Non-exporter 83.3 77.3 21.5 67.7 145.4
Exporter 98.9 69.9 36.9 85.9 159.9
2007
Non-exporter 78.5 60.7 34.3 63.0 139.8
Exporter 102.3 90.0 44.2 81.4 166.8
Notes:  TFP is constructed following Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). The means, standard deviations, 10th, 50th, and 
90th percentile of TFP are separately reported for non-exporters and exporters in the years 1996, 2002, 
and 2007. All values are expressed as percentage of the yearly-industry average, weighted by inverse 
drawing probability weights.
Table 3.B.3: Is TFP Pareto distributed?
k-parameter R2 Obs.
Pooled sample
Total 1.144 0.734 20,580
By year
1996 1.204 0.741 955
1997 1.114 0.724 936
1998 1.059 0.692 1,093
1999 1.130 0.714 1,309
2000 1.103 0.718 2,008
2001 1.128 0.724 2,213
2002 1.058 0.700 2,145
2003 1.079 0.700 2,158
2004 1.138 0.734 2,134
2005 1.119 0.740 1,990
2006 1.307 0.820 1,839
2007 1.309 0.808 1,789
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By industry
Textiles 1.032 0.698 664
Printing 1.036 0.695 1,093
Wood 1.225 0.779 1,138
Chemicals 1.134 0.766 1,198
Plastic 1.083 0.596 1,122
Non-metallic 1.192 0.725 1,116
Metallic 1.199 0.695 1,636
Recycling 1.073 0.766 178
Steel 1.273 0.678 2,599
Machinery 1.206 0.695 2,947
Vehicles a 1.076 0.722 1,124
Vehicles b 1.066 0.733 324
Electronic 1.179 0.758 1,730
Optic 1.229 0.712 1,190
Furniture 1.006 0.627 570
3.C Further results and robustness checks
Exporter wage premium and rent-sharing: direct effects. Table 3.C.1 reports 
the results of estimating equation (3.1) without including the interaction effect.
Differential effects according to skill-type. To check whether the wage imputation 
for workers beyond the social security income threshold matters for our results, 
we run regressions separately for blue and white collar workers. Wage censoring 
is not an issue for blue collar workers whose income is almost always below the 
censoring ceiling. Results are reported in Tables 3.C.2 and 3.C.3. The interaction 
is significant only for plants that set wages collectively and the magnitude of 
rent-sharing is lower for blue than for white collar workers. Regressions based 
on the sample of white collar workers confirm the results from the benchmark 
regressions that also include spell-fixed effects. Again this could be driven by the 
wage censoring that results in a more compressed wage profile around the wage 
ceiling.
Firm-level versus industry-level agreements. Tables 3.C.4 and 3.C.5 report results 
for different levels of bargaining regimes. Regressions reported in the first panel 
include the export-share as openness measure, whereas industry-level openness 
was used in the lower panel. Columns (1)–(3) in each panel focus on plants that 
indicate the use of firm-level collective agreements, whereas columns (4)–(6) in 
each panel are based on the subsample of centralized collective bargaining plants. 
All regressions still reveal a positive relationship between plant profitability and 
wages paid to the workers. Additionally, the export-share and the interaction 
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between export-share and the plant-level profitability measure are negative and 
significant for OLS and random-effects.
Cross-check for representativeness of our results. We rerun all of our key 
regressions using cross-sectional weights in order to check for representativeness 
of our data. Results are reported in Table 3.C.6. Columns (1) to (3) replicate the key 
pooled OLS results reported in Table 3.1, column (1), and column (1) and column 
(4) in the upper panel of Table 3.2. Coefficients obtained from the weighted 
regressions have the same signs and level of significance but all coefficients are 
slightly lower in the weighted regressions.
Additional differential bargaining regime results. The following tables report 
results where we run regression setups separately for collective and non-collective 
bargaining plants. Table 3.C.7 displays the results for the direct effects for 
completeness. Table 3.C.8 and 3.C.9 report results that include interaction terms 
between the export share and the collective bargaining dummy or interaction 
terms between total factor productivity and the collective bargaining dummy. We 
are concerned about the fact that the export intensity reveals little variation over 
time. We therefore focus on the results discussed in the paper, where we do the 
same for plants that report significant changes in their export behavior.
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Table 3.C.1: The export wage-premium and the role of TFP
Dependent variable: Logarithm of individual daily wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Spell FE OLS Spell FE OLS Spell FE
Exports (share of total sales) 0.043*** –0.016 0.049*** 0.001
(0.014) (0.018) (0.014) (0.016)
TFP (ln) 0.025** 0.011***  0.026*** 0.011***
 (0.010) (0.003)  (0.009) (0.004)
Employment (ln) 0.027*** 0.024 0.028*** 0.033 0.026*** 0.033
(0.004) (0.025) (0.004) (0.026) (0.004) (0.026)
Capital intensity (ln) 0.024*** 0.033 0.026*** 0.045** 0.024*** 0.045**
(0.004) (0.020) (0.004) (0.020) (0.004) (0.020)
Female workers (share) –0.334*** –0.072** –0.322*** –0.069** –0.319*** –0.068**
(0.027) (0.033) (0.026) (0.032) (0.026) (0.032)
Part-time workers (share) –0.063 0.059 –0.068 0.047 –0.067 0.047
(0.061) (0.056) (0.055) (0.062) (0.055) (0.062)
Worker council (dummy) 0.103*** 0.003 0.100*** 0.002 0.098*** 0.002
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Age (years) 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.027***  0.025*** 0.027*** 
(0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.006)  (0.001) (0.006)
Age2/100 –0.026*** –0.035*** –0.026*** –0.034*** –0.026*** –0.034***
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005)
Tenure (days) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure2/100 –0.000*** –0.000* –0.000*** –0.000* –0.000*** –0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Medium-skilled (dummy) 0.120*** 0.004 0.120*** 0.000 0.120*** 0.000
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
High-skilled (dummy) 0.357*** 0.072*** 0.358*** 0.059*** 0.356*** 0.059***
(0.011) (0.019) (0.011) (0.019) (0.011) (0.019)
White-collar (dummy) 0.257*** 0.079*** 0.256*** 0.079*** 0.256*** 0.079***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
CA, industry-level (dummy) 0.066*** –0.003 0.063*** –0.003 0.063*** –0.003
(0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
CA, firm-level (dummy) 0.043*** –0.006 0.046*** –0.006 0.047*** –0.007
(0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
R 2 0.618 0.177 0.620 0.180 0.621 0.180
Plants 5040 5040 5040 5040 5040 5040
Observations 4658595 4658595 4658595 4658595 4658595 4658595
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the plant level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5,  
and 10 percent levels, respectively. All estimations include a full set of region, sector, and time dummies. 
Total factor productivity (TFP) is constructed following Iranzo et al. (2008). We apply the Levinsohn and 
Petrin (2003) method to control for unobserved productivity shocks.
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Table 3.C.2: Subsample of blue-collar workers
Dependent variable: Logarithm of individual daily wage
Blue collar workers
Non-collective agreements Collective agreements
OLS Spell FE Spell RE OLS Spell FE Spell RE
TFP (ln) 0.073*** 0.030*** 0.042*** 0.053***  0.030*** 0.039*** 
(0.010) (0.010) 0.010) (0.008)  (0.008) (0.007)
Exports (share) 0.037 –0.205 –0.150 0.529*** 0.269*** 0.379***
(0.230) (0.233) (0.202) (0.132) (0.093) (0.082)
TFP × Exports –0.007 0.022 0.016 –0.057*** –0.032*** –0.043***
(0.028) (0.030) (0.025) (0.016) (0.011) (0.010)
Employment (ln) 0.038*** 0.070*** 0.047*** 0.026*** 0.045 0.035***
(0.006) (0.026) (0.006) (0.004) (0.033) (0.004)
Capital intensity (ln) 0.030*** 0.051*** 0.034*** 0.024*** 0.031 0.024***
(0.004) (0.019) (0.005) (0.004) (0.027) (0.004)
Female workers (share) –0.392*** –0.019 –0.245*** –0.424*** –0.111*** –0.338***
(0.030) (0.037) (0.030) (0.036) (0.042) (0.029)
Part-time workers (share) 0.116 0.063* 0.034 0.058 0.132** 0.072
(0.092) (0.036) (0.039) (0.069) (0.065) (0.047)
Worker council (dummy) 0.051***  –0.039** 0.008 0.064*** 0.010 0.034***
(0.012) (0.018) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.007)
Age (years) 0.018*** 0.003 0.020*** 0.015***  0.027*** 0.021*** 
(0.001) (0.008) (0.002) (0.001)  (0.006) (0.002)
Age2/100 –0.021*** –0.023*** –0.025*** –0.017*** –0.029***  –0.025***
(0.001) (0.007) (0.003) (0.001) (0.006) (0.003)
Tenure (days) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure2/100 –0.000***  –0.000 –0.000*** –0.000*** –0.000 –0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Medium-skilled (dummy) 0.139*** 0.010 0.132*** 0.109*** 0.002 0.086***
(0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.003) (0.006) (0.010)
High-skilled (dummy) 0.334*** 0.015 0.282*** 0.218*** 0.004 0.160***
(0.018) (0.053) (0.021) (0.014) (0.013) (0.021)
R 2 0.536 0.118 0.493 0.188
Plants 2512 2512 2512 3238 3238 3238
Observations 344930 344930 344930 2692308 2692308 2692308
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the plant level. ***, **, and * denote signicance at the 1, 5,  
and 10 percent levels, respectively. All estimations include a full set of region, sector, and time dummies. 
Total factor productivity (TFP) is constructed following Iranzo et al. (2008). We apply the Levinsohn and 
Petrin (2003) method to control for unobserved productivity shocks.
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Table 3.C.3: Subsample of white-collar workers
Dependent variable: Logarithm of individual daily wage
White collar workers
Non-collective agreements Collective agreements
OLS Spell FE Spell RE OLS Spell FE Spell RE
TFP (ln) 0.104*** 0.028*** 0.049*** 0.082***  0.020*** 0.044***
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)  (0.008) (0.007)
Exports (share) 0.854*** 0.022 0.297** 0.974*** 0.175** 0.482***
(0.220) (0.136) (0.126) (0.129) (0.084) (0.086)
TFP × Exports –0.103*** –0.007 –0.038** –0.110*** –0.020** –0.055***
(0.027) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.010) (0.010)
Employment (ln) 0.063*** 0.090*** 0.073*** 0.019*** 0.023 0.024***
(0.005) (0.024) (0.006) (0.004) (0.026) (0.004)
Capital intensity (ln) 0.032*** 0.048*** 0.037*** 0.024*** 0.045** 0.027***
(0.005) (0.019) (0.006) (0.004) (0.023) (0.005)
Female workers (share) –0.160*** –0.004 –0.092*** –0.114*** –0.057 –0.108***
(0.036) (0.032) (0.027) (0.033) (0.041) (0.032)
Part-time workers (share) –0.186*** 0.036 –0.095** –0.225** –0.064 –0.114**
(0.058) (0.036) (0.047) (0.094) (0.087) (0.054)
Worker council (dummy) 0.036*** –0.010 0.012 0.154*** 0.000 0.090***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.012) (0.019) (0.008) (0.016)
Age (years) 0.053*** –0.033* 0.053*** 0.061*** 0.055***  0.065***
 (0.002) (0.017) (0.002) (0.001) (0.008)  (0.002)
Age2/100 –0.052*** –0.048*** –0.052*** –0.058*** –0.061*** –0.063***
(0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001) (0.006) (0.002)
Tenure (days) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure2/100 –0.000*** –0.000 –0.000** –0.000***  –0.000 –0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Medium-skilled (dummy) 0.109*** 0.014 0.099*** 0.108*** 0.046*** 0.109***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.010) (0.017)
High-skilled (dummy) 0.376*** 0.039 0.353*** 0.322*** 0.065*** 0.316***
(0.018) (0.030) (0.016) (0.020) (0.021) (0.024)
R 2 0.477 0.168 0.479 0.212
Plants 2246 2246 2246 3046 3046 3046
Observations 146898 146898 146898 1474459 1474459 1474459
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the plant level. ***, **, and * denote signicance at the 1, 5,  
and 10 percent levels, respectively. All estimations include a full set of region, sector, and time dummies. 
Total factor productivity (TFP) is constructed following Iranzo et al. (2008). We apply the Levinsohn and 
Petrin (2003) method to control for unobserved productivity shocks.
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Table 3.C.4: Firm- vs. industry-level agreements, firm-level openness
Dependent variable: Logarithm of individual daily wage
Firm-level agreement Industry-level agreement
OLS Spell FE Spell RE OLS Spell FE Spell RE
TFP (ln) 0.068*** 0.019** 0.039*** 0.055***  0.032*** 0.043*** 
(0.013) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008)
Exports (share) 0.789*** 0.129 0.399*** 0.347** 0.186 0.248**
(0.157) (0.142) (0.113) (0.164) (0.135) (0.123)
TFP × Exports –0.089*** –0.017 –0.047*** –0.037* –0.022 –0.029**
(0.018) (0.015) (0.012) (0.020) (0.016) (0.015)
Employment (ln) 0.044*** 0.023 0.046*** 0.020*** 0.029 0.027***
(0.004) (0.034) (0.005) (0.004) (0.033) (0.005)
Capital intensity (ln) 0.031*** 0.025 0.034*** 0.024*** 0.044 0.026***
(0.005) (0.031) (0.006) (0.005) (0.031) (0.005)
Female workers (share) –0.374*** –0.005 –0.287*** –0.325*** –0.113** –0.261***
(0.055) (0.074) (0.046) (0.034) (0.051) (0.031)
Part-time workers (share) –0.076 –0.027 –0.093 –0.019 0.049 0.026
(0.101) (0.109) (0.074) (0.066) (0.102) (0.052)
Worker council (dummy) 0.058*** –0.011 0.049*** 0.092*** 0.011 0.048***
(0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.012) (0.009)
Age (years) 0.023*** 0.000 0.025*** 0.026***  0.031*** 0.031*** 
(0.001) (0.013) (0.004) (0.001)  (0.006) (0.002)
Age2/100 –0.024*** –0.020* –0.026***  –0.025*** –0.036*** –0.031***
(0.001) (0.011) (0.004) (0.001) (0.006) (0.003)
Tenure (days) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure2/100 –0.000*** –0.000* –0.000** –0.000*** –0.000 –0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Medium-skilled (dummy) 0.109*** –0.005 0.050*** 0.122*** 0.003 0.117***
(0.006) (0.011) (0.018) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006)
High-skilled (dummy) 0.298*** 0.022 0.224*** 0.360*** 0.109*** 0.383***
(0.028) (0.020) (0.055) (0.010) (0.015) (0.012)
White-collar (dummy) 0.280*** 0.060** 0.245*** 0.251*** 0.077*** 0.209***
(0.016) (0.023) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009)
R 2 0.685 0.156 0.584 0.206
Plants 845 845 845 2804 2804 2804
Observations 654761 654761 654761 3512006 3512006 3512006
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the plant level. ***, **, and * denote signicance at the 1, 5,  
and 10 percent levels, respectively. All estimations include a full set of region, sector, and time dummies. 
Total factor productivity (TFP) is constructed following Iranzo et al. (2008). We apply the Levinsohn and 
Petrin (2003) method to control for unobserved productivity shocks.
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Table 3.C.5: Firm- vs. industry-level agreements, industry-level openness
Dependent variable: Logarithm of individual daily wage
Firm-level agreement Industry-level agreement
OLS Spell FE Spell RE OLS Spell FE Spell RE
TFP (ln) 0.109*** 0.033 0.070* 0.075***  0.041* 0.050*** 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.038) (0.015)  (0.021) (0.016)
Openness 0.072*** 0.032 0.050* 0.032 0.024 0.023
(0.024) (0.032) (0.030) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020)
Openness × TFP –0.005***  –0.001 –0.003* –0.003** –0.001 –0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Employment (ln) 0.049*** 0.039 0.047*** 0.021** 0.026 0.027***
(0.005) (0.039) (0.003) (0.007) (0.035) (0.006)
Capital intensity (ln) 0.031*** 0.033 0.033*** 0.024*** 0.041 0.026***
(0.005) (0.034) (0.008) (0.005) (0.038) (0.004)
Female workers (share) –0.369***  –0.028 –0.292***  –0.323***  –0.123 –0.263***
(0.066) (0.090) (0.068) (0.041) (0.101) (0.046)
Part-time workers (share) –0.120 –0.102 –0.155* –0.028 0.049 0.021
(0.113) (0.090) (0.091) (0.075) (0.123) (0.086)
Worker council (dummy) 0.071*** –0.010 0.052*** 0.098*** 0.011 0.050***
(0.013) (0.024) (0.015) (0.026) (0.017) (0.014)
Age (years) 0.023*** –0.001 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.030***  0.031*** 
(0.001) (0.014) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006)  (0.003)
Age2/100 –0.024*** –0.019** –0.025*** –0.025*** –0.035*** –0.031***
(0.001) (0.009) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004)
Tenure (days) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure2/100 –0.000*** –0.000* –0.000** –0.000*** –0.000* –0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Medium-skilled (dummy) 0.109*** –0.005 0.050* 0.122*** 0.002 0.117***
(0.010) (0.015) (0.026) (0.010) (0.008) (0.013)
High-skilled (dummy) 0.299*** 0.020 0.223*** 0.362*** 0.107*** 0.384***
(0.034) (0.021) (0.070) (0.015) (0.021) (0.015)
White-collar (dummy) 0.281*** 0.059** 0.246*** 0.250*** 0.076*** 0.208***
(0.015) (0.025) (0.011) (0.015) (0.007) (0.017)
R 2 0.684 0.160 0.584 0.210
Plants 838 838 838 2790 2790 2790
Observations 654524 654524 654524 3510613 3510613 3510613
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the industry level. ***, **, and * denote signicance at the 1, 5, 
and 10 percent levels, respectively. All estimations include a full set of region, sector, and time dummies. 
Total factor productivity (TFP) is constructed following Iranzo et al. (2008). We apply the Levinsohn and 
Petrin (2003) method to control for unobserved productivity shocks.
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Table 3.C.6: (Un)weighted results
Dependent variable: Logarithm of individual daily wage
Unweighted Cross-sectional plant-level weights
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
All CA=yes CA=no All CA=yes CA=no
TFP (ln) 0.071*** 0.083*** 0.066*** 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.058*** 
(0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007)
Exports (share) 0.773*** 0.287 0.726*** 0.372** –0.181 0.448***
(0.110) (0.207) (0.124) (0.151) (0.253) (0.151)
Exports × TLP –0.088*** –0.037 –0.081*** –0.044** 0.020 –0.052***
(0.013) (0.026) (0.015) (0.018) (0.031) (0.018)
R 2 0.621 0.590 0.597 0.554 0.504 0.543
Plants 5040 2626 3302 5040 2626 3302
Observations 4658595 491828 4166767 4658595 491828 4166767
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the plant level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, 
and 10 percent levels, respectively. Controls included but not reported are age, age squared, tenure, tenure 
squared, medium-, high-skill and white-collar dummies, plant size, capital intensity, the share of females 
and part timers and a dummy for the existence of a worker council. Additionally, all estimations include a 
full set of region, sector, and time dummies. Total factor productivity (TFP) is constructed following Iranzo 
et al. (2008). We apply the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method to control for unobserved productivity 
shocks.
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Table 3.C.7: The export wage-premium and the role of TFP by bargaining regime (I)
Dependent variable: Logarithm of individual daily wage
No collective agreement
OLS Spell FE OLS Spell FE OLS Spell FE
Exports (share) 0.009 –0.033 –0.013 –0.034
(0.022) (0.027) (0.020) (0.027)
TFP (ln) 0.073*** 0.033*** 0.074*** 0.033***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008)
R 2 0.579 0.113 0.590 0.125 0.590 0.126
Plants 2626 2626 2626 2626 2626 2626
Observations 491828 491828 491828 491828 491828 491828
Collective agreement
OLS Spell FE OLS Spell FE OLS Spell FE
Exports (share) 0.048*** –0.012 0.055*** 0.005
(0.015) (0.019) (0.015) (0.016)
TFP (ln) 0.022** 0.010*** 0.023*** 0.010***
(0.010) (0.003) (0.008) (0.004)
R 2 0.592 0.188 0.593 0.191 0.595 0.191
Plants 3302 3302 3302 3302 3302 3302
Observations 4166767 4166767 4166767 4166767 4166767 4166767
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the plant level in the upper panel and the industry level in 
the lower panel. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Controls 
included but not reported are age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, medium-, high-skill and white-
collar dummies, plant size, capital intensity, the share of females and part timers and a dummy for the 
existence of a worker council. Additionally, all estimations include a full set of region, sector, and time 
dummies. Total factor productivity (TFP) is constructed following Iranzo et al. (2008). We apply the 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method to control for unobserved productivity shocks.
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Table 3.C.8: The export wage-premium and the role of TFP by bargaining regime (II)
Dependent variable: Logarithm of individual daily wage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS Spell FE OLS Spell FE
Exports (share) 0.063** –0.006 0.046*** 0.000
(0.025) (0.022) (0.014) (0.016)
TFP (ln) 0.026*** 0.011*** 0.082*** 0.026***
(0.009) (0.004) (0.009) (0.006)
Coll. Agg. (dummy) 0.065*** –0.007 0.539*** 0.120**
(0.014) (0.007) (0.090) (0.055)
Coll. Agg. × Exports –0.015 0.008
(0.026) (0.025)
Coll. Agg. × TFP –0.060*** –0.016**
(0.011) (0.007)
R 2 0.621 0.180 0.622 0.181
Plants 5040 5040 5040 5040
Observations 4658595 4658595 4658595 4658595
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the plant-level in (1)-(2) and at the industry-level in (3)-(4). 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Controls included but not 
reported are age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, medium-, high-skill and white-collar dummies, 
plant size, capital intensity, the share of females and part timers and dummies for the existence of a 
worker council. Additionally, all estimations include a full set of region, sector, and time dummies. Total 
factor productivity (TFP) is constructed following Iranzo et al. (2008). We apply the Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003) method to control for unobserved productivity shocks.
Table 3.C.9: The export wage-premium and the role of TFP by bargaining regime (III)
Dependent variable: Logarithm of individual daily wage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS Spell FE OLS Spell FE
Exports (share) –0.032 0.004 0.050*** 0.001
(0.021) (0.023) (0.014) (0.016)
TFP (ln) 0.027*** 0.011*** 0.020** 0.012***
(0.009) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004)
Coll. Agg. × Exports 0.090*** –0.002
(0.020) (0.026)
Coll. Agg. × TFP 0.007*** –0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
R 2 0.620 0.180 0.620 0.180
Plants 5040 5040 5040 5040
Observations 4658595 4658595 4658595 4658595
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the plant-level in (1)-(2) and at the industry-level in (3)-(4). 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Controls included but not 
reported are age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, medium-, high-skill and white-collar dummies, 
plant size, capital intensity, the share of females and part timers and dummies for the existence of a 
worker council. Additionally, all estimations include a full set of region, sector, and time dummies. Total 
factor productivity (TFP) is constructed following Iranzo et al. (2008). We apply the Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003) method to control for unobserved productivity shocks.
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3.D Detailed regression output tables
Table 3.D.1: Detailed output to Table 3.1
Dependent variable: Logarithm of individual daily wage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS Spell FE OLS Spell FE
TFP (ln) 0.071*** 0.029*** 0.108*** 0.053**
(0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.021)
Exports (share) 0.785*** 0.243***
(0.111) (0.074)
TFP × Exports –0.089*** –0.029***
(0.013) (0.009)
Sectoral trade openness (share) 0.056*** 0.033
(0.018) (0.021)
TFP × Openness –0.005***  –0.002**
(0.001) (0.001)
Employment (ln) 0.024*** 0.029 0.025*** 0.027
(0.004) (0.026) (0.008) (0.019)
Capital intensity (ln) 0.026*** 0.041** 0.026*** 0.040
(0.004) (0.020) (0.004) (0.023)
Female workers (share) –0.323*** –0.068**  –0.313***  –0.073
(0.026) (0.032) (0.039) (0.065)
Part-time workers (share) –0.017 0.051 –0.053 0.026
(0.054) (0.062) (0.081) (0.080)
Worker council (dummy) 0.088*** 0.001 0.097*** 0.002
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007)
Age (years) 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.026***
(0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006)
Age2/100 –0.025*** –0.034***  –0.025***  –0.033***
(0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004)
Tenure (days) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure2/100 –0.000*** –0.000* –0.000*** –0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Medium-skilled (dummy) 0.120*** 0.000 0.120*** 0.002
(0.004) (0.006) (0.010) (0.008)
High-skilled (dummy) 0.357*** 0.060*** 0.358*** 0.063**
(0.011) (0.020) (0.022) (0.028)
White-collar (dummy) 0.255*** 0.079*** 0.254*** 0.078***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008)
CA, industry-level (dummy) 0.064*** –0.003 0.064*** –0.001
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
CA, firm-level (dummy) 0.044*** –0.007 0.045*** –0.006
(0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.005)
R 2 0.623 0.181 0.622 0.188
Plants 5040 5040 5003 5003
Observations 4658595 4658595 4654547 4654547
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the plant level in (1)–(2) and at the industry level in (3)–(4).  
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. All estimations include a full 
set of region, sector, and time dummies. Total factor productivity (TFP) is constructed following Iranzo et al. 
(2008). We apply the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method to control for unobserved productivity shocks.
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Table 3.D.2: Detailed output to Table 3.2, upper panel
Dependent variable: Logarithm of individual daily wage
No collective agreement Collective agreement
OLS Spell FE Spell RE OLS Spell FE Spell RE
TFP (ln) 0.083*** 0.031*** 0.045*** 0.066***  0.028*** 0.041*** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008)  (0.008) (0.007)
Exports (share) 0.287 –0.100 0.018 0.726*** 0.244*** 0.423***
(0.207) (0.183) (0.164) (0.124) (0.088) (0.079)
TFP × Exports –0.037 0.008 –0.004 –0.081*** –0.029*** –0.049***
(0.026) (0.023) (0.020) (0.015) (0.011) (0.009)
Employment (ln) 0.044*** 0.075*** 0.054*** 0.023*** 0.028 0.031***
(0.005) (0.025) (0.005) (0.004) (0.030) (0.004)
Capital intensity (ln) 0.031*** 0.050*** 0.035*** 0.025*** 0.036 0.027***
(0.004) (0.018) (0.005) (0.004) (0.026) (0.005)
Female workers (share) –0.344*** –0.015 –0.201*** –0.332*** –0.086** –0.254***
(0.029) (0.035) (0.028) (0.031) (0.042) (0.028)
Part-time workers (share) 0.023 0.062* –0.001 –0.024 0.050 0.019
(0.079) (0.034) (0.038) (0.069) (0.083) (0.045)
Worker council (dummy) 0.050***  –0.031* 0.009 0.088*** 0.009 0.049***
(0.011) (0.017) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.008)
Age (years) 0.025*** –0.005 0.027*** 0.025***  0.030*** 0.030*** 
(0.001) (0.007) (0.002) (0.001)  (0.006) (0.002)
Age2/100 –0.027*** –0.029***  –0.029*** –0.025*** –0.034*** –0.031***
(0.001) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001) (0.006) (0.003)
Tenure (days) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure2/100 –0.000*** –0.000 –0.000*** –0.000*** –0.000* –0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Medium-skilled (dummy) 0.147*** 0.010 0.137*** 0.119*** –0.001 0.100***
(0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.004) (0.006) (0.010)
High-skilled (dummy) 0.432*** 0.052** 0.431*** 0.351*** 0.058*** 0.351***
(0.012) (0.022) (0.012) (0.011) (0.022) (0.025)
White-collar (dummy) 0.239*** 0.080*** 0.206*** 0.255*** 0.077*** 0.215***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
R 2 0.590 0.126 0.597 0.192
Plants 2626 2626 2626 3302 3302 3302
Observations 491828 491828 491828 4166767 4166767 4166767
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the plant level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5,  
and 10 percent levels, respectively. All estimations include a full set of region, sector, and time dummies. 
Total factor productivity (TFP) is constructed following Iranzo et al. (2008). We apply the Levinsohn and 
Petrin (2003) method to control for unobserved productivity shocks.
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Table 3.D.3: Detailed output to Table 3.2, lower panel
Dependent variable: Logarithm of individual daily wage
No collective agreement Collective agreement
OLS Spell FE Spell RE OLS Spell FE Spell RE
TFP (ln) 0.101*** 0.058 0.078** 0.104***  0.050** 0.073*** 
(0.027) (0.044) (0.039) (0.013)  (0.020) (0.014)
Sectoral openness (share) 0.053 0.048 0.055 0.052** 0.030 0.039**
(0.037) (0.042) (0.040) (0.018) (0.020) (0.018)
TFP × openness –0.003 –0.002 –0.003 –0.005*** –0.002** –0.004***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Employment (ln) 0.043*** 0.090*** 0.054*** 0.024*** 0.025 0.031***
(0.004) (0.014) (0.006) (0.007) (0.026) (0.006)
Capital intensity (ln) 0.029*** 0.058*** 0.034*** 0.025*** 0.033 0.026***
(0.004) (0.013) (0.006) (0.005) (0.028) (0.004)
Female workers (share) –0.343*** –0.010 –0.193***  –0.323*** –0.094 –0.252***
(0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.043) (0.084) (0.046)
Part-time workers (share) 0.013 0.040 –0.017 –0.052 0.024 –0.011
(0.087) (0.034) (0.034) (0.091) (0.099) (0.071)
Worker council (dummy) 0.051***  –0.028** 0.009 0.100*** 0.009 0.051***
(0.007) (0.012) (0.006) (0.017) (0.013) (0.009)
Age (years) 0.024*** –0.003 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.029***  0.030*** 
(0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007)  (0.002)
Age2/100 –0.027*** –0.028*** –0.029*** –0.025*** –0.033*** –0.030***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Tenure (days) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure2/100 –0.000***  –0.000 –0.000*** –0.000*** –0.000*** –0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Medium-skilled (dummy) 0.148*** 0.017* 0.139*** 0.119*** 0.001 0.101***
(0.011) (0.008) (0.014) (0.009) (0.008) (0.019)
High-skilled (dummy) 0.432*** 0.065*** 0.433*** 0.353*** 0.060* 0.352***
(0.015) (0.018) (0.019) (0.022) (0.030) (0.038)
White-collar (dummy) 0.240*** 0.081*** 0.204*** 0.255*** 0.076*** 0.215***
(0.014) (0.007) (0.011) (0.014) (0.007) (0.015)
R 2 0.592 0.152 0.596 0.196
Plants 2594 2594 2594 3284 3284 3284
Observations 489410 489410 489410 4165137 4165137 4165137
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the industry level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, 
and 10 percent levels, respectively. All estimations include a full set of region, sector, and time dummies. 
Total factor productivity (TFP) is constructed following Iranzo et al. (2008). We apply the Levinsohn and 
Petrin (2003) method to control for unobserved productivity shocks.
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Table 3.D.4: Detailed output to Table 3.3
Dependent variable: Logarithm of individual daily (first differences)
Collective agreements
No CA CA No CA CA CA CA
BC and/or WC workers All All All All BC WC
Exports (dummy) 0.007** –0.006*
(0.003) (0.003)
Export (share) 0.002 –0.018*** –0.020** –0.013**
(0.014) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006)
Employment (ln) 0.045*** 0.036*** 0.044*** 0.036*** 0.048***  0.024*** 
(0.012) (0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.009)  (0.008)
Female workers (share) –0.024 0.004 –0.022 0.009 0.015 –0.000
(0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.022) (0.027) (0.021)
Part-time workers (share) –0.038 –0.007 –0.038 –0.005 –0.020 0.019
(0.024) (0.035) (0.025) (0.035) (0.038) (0.040)
Worker council (dummy) 0.004 0.007 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.008
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Tenure (days) 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure2/100 –0.000*** –0.000*** –0.000*** –0.000*** –0.000*** –0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure3/1000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)
White-collar worker (dummy) 0.077*** 0.045*** 0.076*** 0.045***
(0.014) (0.006) (0.014) (0.006)
Low-skilled worker (dummy) –0.022 –0.046*** –0.022 –0.046*** 0.016 –0.064***
(0.021) (0.015) (0.021) (0.015) (0.014) (0.021)
Medium-skilled worker 
(dummy)
–0.005 –0.037*** –0.005 –0.037*** 0.019 –0.032**
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
R2 0.086 0.052 0.085 0.052 0.074 0.033
Plants 807 864 807 864 846 813
Observations 113854 747981 113854 747981 484942 263039
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the plant level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, 
and 10 percent levels, respectively. All estimations include a full set of region, sector, and time dummies. 
Constant estimated but not reported. All variables are in first differences. The sample only includes plants 
that switch their export status at least once during the entire period. Column (1) estimates the change of 
wages on the change of export dummy for non collective agreement plants. Column (2) includes collective 
agreement plants only. Columns (3) to (4) replicates columns (1) and (2) including the export share. 
Columns (5) to (6) replicates column (4) but for blue collar (BC) and white collar workers (WC) separately.
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4.1 Introduction
Do exporters really pay higher wages than non-exporting firms?1 Bernard, Jensen, 
and Lawrence (1995); Bernard and Jensen (1999) sparked off a rapidly growing 
number of studies that raised this question for numerous countries. Most of those 
studies provide evidence that exporters pay higher average wages compared to 
domestic firms, even after controlling for firm size, capital intensity, industry 
affiliation, and firm-fixed effects. However, it is also well established that this 
premium decreases considerably once worker and workplace characteristics are 
accounted for (Schank, Schnabel, and Wagner, 2007). In this sense, the answer 
to the question posed above highly depends on the identification strategy. The 
common practice is to estimate wage premiums building on standard Mincer 
equations either at the employer or the employee level, and to account for 
observable characteristics and employer-, employee-, or spell-fixed effects. This 
approach, however, identifies the wage premium on the within variation of the 
data alone. One might argue that the export status or the export intensity exhibits 
a low variation over time, leading to imprecise estimates.
Based on this, a number of recent contributions also provide theoretical 
explanations for this stylized exporter wage premium. Imperfect labor markets 
together with rent sharing imply that workers in exporting firms can materialize 
some of the relative gains from exporting. In Egger, Egger, and Kreickemeier 
(2011), the rent-sharing mechanism is introduced by workers’ fair-wage concerns. 
Workers may reduce their effort if the wage actually paid by their employers falls 
short of what they might consider to be the fair one. Therefore, profit-maximizing 
firms have an incentive to pay this fair wage in order to motivate their workers to 
invest full effort. Besides general elements, such as the expected average wage in 
the economy, fair wages also depend on the firm’s “ability to pay”, its operating 
profits. Loosely speaking, an exporter wage premium (conditional on productivity) 
arises as exporting firms increase their profits by extra business abroad.2
The aim of this paper is to provide empirical support for the“fair-wage exporter 
premium”.3 One particular feature of the fair-wage approach is that employers 
have their own incentive to pay higher wages than just the lowest wage possible. 
1 This chapter is joint work together with Hans-Jörg Schmerer (IAB Nuremberg), compare Hauptmann and 
Schmerer (2013). 
2 By now there are several other contributions with exporters paying higher wages than non-exporters, e.g. Egger 
and Kreickemeier (2009), Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2010), Davis and Harrigan (2011), and Amiti and 
Davis (2012). However, heterogeneous firms and labor market imperfections do not always lead to a premium 
conditional on productivity. Furthermore, in Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer (2011), not even an unconditional 
premium arises.
3 The focus of this paper is on the particular channel of fair wages and does not deny the existence of other 
channels.
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Using German plant-level data, we propose a new identification strategy based 
on voluntary payments above the agreed wage floor for employers subject to 
collective agreements.4 Germany is the ideal laboratory for such an experiment, 
due to its high collective agreement coverage. The bargained wage between the 
employer (or employer’s association) and the union constitutes a wage floor, which 
is legally binding from below. Employers, however, are always allowed to make their 
employees better off in terms of for example wages (Günstigkeitsprinzip). Roughly 
50% of the unionized plants indicate payments above the union wage floor.
Our test is based on the IAB establishment panel, a survey of German plants that 
employ at least one employee subject to social security contributions. The data set 
contains information about plant size, revenues, input of intermediates, and the 
international interdependency as measured by the share of revenues generated 
through exports of goods to foreign markets.5 For more information, see Fischer, 
Janik, Müller, and Schmucker (2009) and Kölling (2000). The plants’ capital stock 
is constructed using the perpetual inventory method as proposed by Müller (2008, 
2010). We merge industry-level STAN data on U.S. global trade shares obtained 
from the OECD database in order to instrument plant export intensity. We focus 
on the period between 1996 and 2007, because 1996 was the first year Eastern 
Germany was included in the survey. Furthermore, we restrict the sample to plants 
in manufacturing industries. Summary statistics of our estimation sample are 
provided in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Summary statistics–estimation sample
Mean Std.Dev.
Wage drift (in percent) 5.807 7.028
Exports (percent of total sales) 18.804 24.059
Employment (ln) 4.228 1.881
Capital (ln) 14.883 2.530
Labor productivity (ln) 10.865 0.738
Part-time workers (share) 0.082 0.117
Short-time workers (share) 0.034 0.057
Female workers (share) 0.262 0.204
West-Germany (dummy) 0.653 0.475
IT investment (dummy) 0.644 0.364
Transport investment (dummy) 0.310 0.341
Global US trade share 10.554 3.714
4 Focusing on the wage drift inevitably shifts the focus towards larger firms.
5 Unfortunately we only observe exports in general, and therefore we cannot distinguish between different export 
destinations.
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Besides this rich set of plant characteristics, the data cover detailed information 
on whether plants are subject to firm-level or industry-level collective agreements. 
Even more important, we know whether the firm pays more than the union wage 
rate, and by how much.6 Thus, we can circumvent the standard fixed-effects 
approach and exploit the information made available by the plants directly.
An important contribution of the present paper is the way we address 
endogeneity. Our instrumental variable (IV) approach allows us to interpret the 
derived exporter wage premium as a causal relationship between the export 
intensity and the wage nexus. We use the industry-level export share for the U.S. 
to instrument the plant’s export intensity. At the plant level we also include the 
average investment in IT and transportation equipment. Purging the data from 
the simultaneity bias increases the magnitude of the exporter wage premium 
closer to the numbers obtained from the structural estimation in Egger, Egger, and 
Kreickemeier (2011).
4.2 Econometric specification and data
To identify whether exporting plants are more inclined towards paying higher 
wages than the collectively agreed wage floor, we estimate
  (4.1)
where WDi denotes the wage drift of plant i measured in percentage above the 
collectively agreed wage. Our choice of this dependent variable restricts the 
sample to plants subject to collective agreements. Coefficient α is the estimated 
constant, EXPi denotes export intensity measured in percentage of total revenues, 
and the vector Xi comprises various plant controls. The analysis will be carried 
out at the cross-sectional plant level to account for the missing values in the 
dependent variable within entire waves.7
It can be argued that neither the export intensity nor the wage drift measures 
exhibit enough variation over time. This raises the question whether the application 
of estimators that rely on the within variation of the data is appropriate. The 
exclusion of fixed-effect controls, however, gives rise to potential endogeneity 
concerns. We use an IV regression approach in order to purge the simultaneity bias 
from the regressions. Our preferred instruments are the U.S. industry openness and 
investment dummies. Due to its outstanding relevance for German exporters, we 
6 The question utilized in our analysis is: “… please approximate the percentage rate by which the salaries and 
wages paid by your company exceed the collectively agreed scale?”.
7 We generate mean values for all variables included in the regression.
WDi = α + λEXPi + βXi + i,
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expect the plant-level export intensity to be highly correlated with U.S. openness 
at the industry level. On the other hand, there should be no direct link between 
the U.S. openness and German wages, so the instrument should be orthogonal 
to the dependent variable. We also include the share of IT investments and 
investment in transport and equipment as instruments. Firms that export more 
likely have higher investments into communication and transportation equipment 
for a better handling of transactions across borders. Both investment shares are 
highly correlated with the export intensity, but there are no obvious reasons for a 
direct link to abovetariff payments. These additional instruments allow us to run 
a Hansen test of overidentification.
To account for the fact that our dependent variable is truncated from below, 
we use corner-solution (IV-)Tobit models. Indeed, a substantial number of plants 
report zero wage drift, which may bias our results.
4.3 Main results
Table 4.1 summarizes the regression coefficients of the variable of interest, the 
export intensity. Results are obtained from different model setups. The coefficients 
are significant and positive in the majority of regression setups, thereby indicating 
a positive exporter (fair) wage premium. In the upper panel, the results obtained 
from standard OLS in columns (1)–(3) indicate a relatively small exporter wage 
premium close to the results reported based on matched employer–employee data 
(see Schank, Schnabel, and Wagner, 2007; Klein, Moser, and Urban, 2010). Including 
labor productivity in column (2) only slightly reduces the magnitude of the effect. 
It rather indicates that the reported wage drift is more than a pure productivity 
premium. Specification (3) adds a West Germany dummy. All specifications also 
include control variables for employment, capital, as well as several workforce 
characteristics such as the share of female, short-time and part-time workers. 
Only the inclusion of the West Germany dummy yields insignificant results for the 
export share. 
Next, the effect might be downward biased due to a general wage restraint 
policy after the year 2000. Wages were stagnant, but the export intensity 
increased, so the true exporter wage premium is underestimated in our cross-
sectional regressions. Regression (4)–(6) treat export intensity as endogenous by 
constructing an exogenous export intensity in the first stage, based on the U.S. 
openness and the IT plant investment dummy. The first-stage R-squared and the 
first-stage F-statistic do not reject the validity of the instruments according to 
the Stock–Yogo critical values for the test on weak identification. The first-stage 
F-statistics are all higher than the critical thresholds. To test the validity of our 
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instruments, we include a second instrument to run the Hansen test. The test does 
not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid. The results are robust 
against variations in the model setup.
Table 4.2: Regression output
Dependent variable: Payment above union wage floor (in percent)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Whole sample including plants with at least one observation
OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
Exports (percent of total sales) 0.018*** 0.014*** 0.005 0.141*** 0.133*** 0.131***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.041) (0.047) (0.047)
Tobit Tobit Tobit IV-Tobit IV-Tobit IV-Tobit
Exports (percent of total sales) 0.017*** 0.012*** 0.001 0.126*** 0.113*** 0.112*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.037) (0.042) (0.043)
Labor productivity . × × . × ×
West Germany dummy . . × . . ×
Hansen J-statistic . . . 0.116 0.136 0.094
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic . . . 44.34 38.665 38.429
Panel B: Sample including plants with at least three observations
OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
Exports (percent of total sales) 0.018*** 0.014**  0.006 0.118*** 0.108** 0.115** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.042) (0.050) (0.049)
Tobit Tobit Tobit IV-Tobit IV-Tobit IV-Tobit
Exports (percent of total sales) 0.016*** 0.012** 0.002 0.100*** 0.084* 0.095**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.038) (0.044) (0.046)
Labor productivity . × × . × ×
West Germany dummy . . × . . ×
Hansen J-statistic . . . 0.135 0.147 0.072
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic . . . 44.576 37.919 38.298
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. Plants subject to collective agreements only. Observations collapsed over time to the cross 
sectional establishment level. Only the variable of interest reported. Controls for size, capital, share of 
part-time, short-term, and female workers included in all regressions. Export intensity is instrumented by 
transport expansion investment dummy, IT expansion investment dummy, and U.S. industry-level openness 
in (4) to (6) employing 2sls IV and IV-TOBIT estimators. Marginal effects reported only. First-stage test 
statistics are obtained from the 2sls estimation. The upper panel includes all plants that report the wage 
drift at least once during the whole sample period (4179 observations), the lower panel includes plants 
that report the wage drift at least three times during the whole sample period (3562 observations). The 
detailed regression output is reported in the Appendix.
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Starting with a more parsimonious setup in column (4) that excludes labor 
productivity and the West Germany dummy, we obtain a 14% premium over the 
whole distribution of export intensity that goes from 0 to 100. The additional 
inclusion of labor productivity in column (5) reduces the magnitude of the effect 
by 0.8% points. Specification (6) differs by controlling for the general location of 
the plant. Generally speaking, wages in West Germany are higher, which does not 
necessarily affect the export intensity to wage drift nexus. All coefficients of the 
export share are significant.
Coefficients reported in the second row account for the cornersolution 
problem by re-estimating the models reported in the first row using Tobit and 
IV-Tobit regressions. The coefficients reported are marginal effects, and thus 
are comparable to the results reported in the first row. The coefficients reveal 
qualitatively the same results, albeit the magnitude of the effect appears to be 
slightly weaker, especially in the IV regressions.
Results in the upper panel are obtained by collapsing the data over the 
time dimension without accounting for the fact that our panel is unbalanced. 
Coefficients reported in the lower panel are based on a sample that excludes 
outliers by restricting the sample to plants that report the wage drift at least 
three times. The results are robust, but the point estimates based on the restricted 
sample are lower in magnitude.8
4.4 Conclusion
Our analysis of the exporter wage determination yields several interesting 
insights. (i) Besides paying higher average wages, exporters are also more likely to 
pay above an agreed union wage floor. With some qualifications, these payments 
are voluntary, and therefore consistent with certain fair-wage considerations. 
(ii) Also, in magnitude, the estimates support the findings documented in the 
structural model of Egger, Egger, and Kreickemeier (2011). (ii) The advantage of 
our approach is that the identification strategy does not rely on the relatively low 
variance of the wage drift over time. Taking into account the lower wage bound 
of plants, we can base the analysis on cross-sectional data. (iii) The results are 
robust to several specifications. In particular, the inclusion of productivity and 
workforce characteristics does not alter the results, which is in favor of the fair-
wage hypothesis.
8 Detailed regression output tables including further robustness checks are available in the Appendix.
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Appendix
4.A Detailed estimation results of Table 4.1
Table 4.A.1: Detailed results of row 1 in Table 4.1
Dependent variable: Payment above union wage floor in percent
(1) 
OLS
(2) 
OLS
(3) 
OLS
(4) 
IV
(5) 
IV
(6) 
IV
Exports (percent of total sales) 0.018*** 0.014*** 0.005 0.141*** 0.133*** 0.131***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.041) (0.047) (0.047)
Employment (ln) –0.122 –0.042 –0.230** –0.714*** –0.645** –0.839***
(0.123) (0.121) (0.117) (0.219) (0.261) (0.250)
Capital (ln) 0.460*** 0.332*** 0.257*** 0.248** 0.200** 0.128
(0.086) (0.094) (0.090) (0.112) (0.101) (0.097)
Part-time workers (share) 2.487** 2.545*** –2.754*** 2.894*** 2.900*** –1.707*
(0.975) (0.970) (0.914) (1.031) (1.024) (1.032)
Short-time workers (share) –5.380*** –4.517** –3.076 –3.951** –3.627* –2.326
(1.979) (2.023) (1.887) (1.983) (1.985) (1.884)
Female workers (share) –1.832*** –1.409** –0.248 –1.312** –1.144* –0.117
(0.564) (0.584) (0.558) (0.605) (0.605) (0.587)
Labor productivity (ln) 0.908*** 0.374* 0.421 –0.069
(0.217) (0.220) (0.363) (0.347)
West-Germany (dummy) 4.450*** 3.884***
(0.218) (0.273)
Observations 4,179 4,179 4,179 4,179 4,179 4,179
R 2
R 2 uncentered 
Hansen J statistic
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic
0.032 0.040 0.114 –0.092
0.351
0.116
44.340
–0.074
0.362
0.136
38.665
–0.013
0.398
0.094
38.429
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signicance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. Observations collapsed to the establishment level. Export intensity is instrumented by 
transport expansion investment dummy, IT expansion investment dummy, and U.S. industry-level openness 
in (4) to (6) employing a 2sls IV estimator. Constant estimated but not reported.
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Table 4.A.2: Detailed results of row 2 in Table 4.1
Dependent variable: Payment above union wage floor in percent
(1)  
TOBIT
(2)  
TOBIT
(3)  
TOBIT
(4)
IV-TOBIT
(5)
IV-TOBIT
(6)
IV-TOBIT
Exports (percent of total sales) 0.017*** 0.012*** 0.001 0.126*** 0.113*** 0.112***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.037) (0.042) (0.043)
Employment (ln) –0.021 0.072 –0.187 –0.541*** –0.439* –0.721***
(0.122) (0.120) (0.116) (0.202) (0.232) (0.233)
Capital (ln) 0.505*** 0.357*** 0.289*** 0.310*** 0.241** 0.171*
(0.086) (0.092) (0.088) (0.104) (0.097) (0.094)
Part-time workers (share) 3.181*** 3.231*** –3.504*** 3.522*** 3.517*** –2.483**
(1.103) (1.097) (1.044) (1.138) (1.133) (1.108)
Short-time workers (share) –6.556*** –5.734** –4.145* –5.157** –4.851** –3.338
(2.286) (2.328) (2.166) (2.207) (2.245) (2.092)
Female workers (share) –1.818*** –1.332** 0.164 –1.336** –1.094* 0.273
(0.584) (0.593) (0.567) (0.613) (0.609) (0.584)
Labor productivity (ln) 1.061*** 0.427** 0.636** 0.029
(0.185) (0.190) (0.283) (0.286)
West-Germany (dummy) 5.550*** 4.958***
(0.256) (0.283)
Observations 4,179 4,179 4,179 4,179 4,179 4,179
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signicance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. Observations collapsed to the establishment level. Export intensity is instrumented by 
transport expansion investment dummy, IT expansion investment dummy, and U.S. industry-level openness 
in (4) to (6) employing a IV-TOBIT estimator. Marginal eects reported only. Constant estimated but not 
reported.
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Table 4.A.3: Detailed results of row 3 in Table 4.1
Dependent variable: Payment above union wage floor in percent
(1)  
OLS
(2)  
OLS
(3)  
OLS
(4)  
IV
(5)  
IV
(6)  
IV
Exports (percent of total sales) 0.018*** 0.014** 0.006 0.118*** 0.108** 0.115**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.042) (0.050) (0.049)
Employment  (ln) –0.130 –0.043 –0.264** –0.593*** –0.510* –0.776***
(0.138) (0.134) (0.131) (0.221) (0.273) (0.262)
Capital (ln) 0.490*** 0.361*** 0.318*** 0.297** 0.241** 0.184*
(0.094) (0.104) (0.101) (0.123) (0.109) (0.107)
Part-time workers (share) 2.975*** 3.045*** –2.426** 3.355*** 3.365*** –1.523
(1.045) (1.045) (0.984) (1.087) (1.082) (1.089)
Short-time workers (share) –5.341** –4.400* –3.081 –4.252* –3.816 –2.543
(2.333) (2.381) (2.179) (2.310) (2.324) (2.168)
Female workers (share) –2.107*** –1.719*** –0.418 –1.724*** –1.540** –0.340
(0.581) (0.605) (0.572) (0.599) (0.608) (0.595)
Labor productivity (ln) 0.868*** 0.325 0.478 –0.067
(0.241) (0.248) (0.405) (0.391)
West-Germany (dummy) 4.342*** 3.917***
(0.236) (0.268)
Observations 3,562 3,562 3,562 3,562 3,562 3,562
R2 0.037 0.044 0.115 –0.045 –0.027 0.022
R2 uncentered 0.379 0.389 0.418
Hansen J statistic 0.135 0.147 0.072
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic 44.576 37.919 38.298
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signicance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. Observations collapsed to the establishment level. Export intensity is instrumented by 
transport expansion investment dummy, IT expansion investment dummy, and U.S. industry-level openness 
in (4) to (6) employing a 2sls IV estimator. Constant estimated but not reported.
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Table 4.A.4: Detailed results of row 4 in Table 4.1
Dependent variable: Payment above union wage floor in percent
(1)  
TOBIT
(2)  
TOBIT
(3)  
TOBIT
(4)
IV-TOBIT
(5)
IV-TOBIT
(6)
IV-TOBIT
Exports (percent of total sales) 0.016*** 0.012** 0.002 0.100*** 0.084* 0.095**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.038) (0.044) (0.046)
Employment (ln) –0.024 0.079 –0.216* –0.413** –0.279 –0.650***
(0.134) (0.131) (0.128) (0.203) (0.240) (0.247)
Capital (ln) 0.535*** 0.380*** 0.351*** 0.367*** 0.284*** 0.232**
(0.094) (0.100) (0.098) (0.113) (0.105) (0.104)
Part-time workers (share) 3.750*** 3.813*** –3.081*** 4.062*** 4.054*** –2.233*
(1.190) (1.188) (1.125) (1.226) (1.225) (1.183)
Short-time workers (share) –6.826** –5.903** –4.639* –5.818** –5.370** –4.066*
(2.673) (2.717) (2.450) (2.589) (2.641) (2.380)
Female workers (share) –2.131*** –1.653*** 0.013 –1.786*** –1.502** 0.083
(0.613) (0.625) (0.590) (0.628) (0.631) (0.604)
Labor productivity (ln) 1.068*** 0.429** 0.761** 0.087
(0.200) (0.208) (0.308) (0.319)
West-Germany (dummy) 5.397*** 4.965***
(0.278) (0.299)
Observations 3,562 3,562 3,562 3,562 3,562 3,562
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signicance at the 1, 5, and 10  percent levels, 
respectively. Observations collapsed to the establishment level. Export intensity is instrumented by  
transport expansion investment dummy, IT expansion investment dummy, and U.S. industry-level openness 
in (4) to (6) employing a IV-TOBIT estimator. Marginal eects reported only. Constant estimated but not 
reported.
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5.1 Introduction
The recent surge of German exports is surrounded by a heated debate on the 
causes and consequences of this so-called “export miracle”.1 Opponents argue that 
Germany has enforced a series of policy reforms that have led to wage moderation 
and thus increased international competitiveness at the expense of its trading 
partners, especially within the Eurozone (cf. Lagarde, 2010).2 While the broader 
political debate focused on the role of diverging unit labor costs for growing 
current account imbalances, the “export miracle” also provokes questions about 
the driving forces of export activity. It is commonly acknowledged that exporting 
firms are distinctly different from their non-exporting competitors. Bernard, 
Jensen, and Lawrence (1995) and Bernard and Jensen (1999) documented for the 
US manufacturing industry that exporting firms are larger, more productive and pay 
higher wages than their national counterparts.3 The seminal work by Melitz (2003) 
provides a tractable theoretical model that is able to explain these stylized facts 
by allowing for firm heterogeneity due to firm-specific productivity levels. While 
there is broad empirical support for this mechanism,4 the economic profession is 
surprisingly quiet about the role of competitiveness for sorting into exporting.
It is the purpose of this paper to fill this gap by investigating the role of unit 
labor costs as a measure of competitiveness for the export activity of German 
plants. Therefore, we construct a proxy for competitiveness that comprises both 
productivity and labor costs. Higher productivity and/or lower labor costs make 
plants more efficient, indicated by a higher level of competitiveness. Moreover, 
we argue that the export promoting effect of competitiveness may be driven at 
two different margins. A rise in competitiveness may increase the probability of 
a plant to switch from the sole domestic supply regime to the exporter regime 
(extensive margin), or it may be associated with a surge in the export intensity of 
already exporting plants (intensive margin). In our view, German plants are highly 
interesting for analyzing these questions mainly for two reasons. First, German 
firms and plants have been particularly active in exporting in the recent past. In 
the period 2000–2010, the German export volume has increased by about 60% and 
surpassed the level of one trillion Euro for the first time in 2012 (cf. Statistisches
1 This chapter is joint work together with Daniel Etzel (University Bayreuth) and Hans-Jörg Schmerer (IAB 
Nuremberg), compare Etzel, Hauptmann, and Schmerer (2013).
2 During an interview with the Financial Times, Lagarde stated: “The issue at hand is really one of competitiveness. 
Clearly Germany has done an awfully good job in the last 10 years or so, improving competitiveness, putting a 
very high pressure on its labor costs. When you look at unit labor costs to Germany, they have done a tremendous 
job in that respect. I’m not sure it is a sustainable model for the long term and for the whole of the group.”
3 Similar results were found for other countries, like Germany (cf. Bernard and Wagner, 1997) and Taiwan (cf. Aw 
and Hwang, 1995).
4 For an excellent survey on this topic see e.g. Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2011).
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Bundesamt, 2012). Secondly, at the same time, a number of structural reforms has 
been initiated on the German labor market. It is therefore often argued that these 
labor market reforms have increased the competitiveness of German firms and 
plants on international markets relative to their competitors from abroad.
In the first step of our analysis, we construct two measures of competitiveness. 
We compute unit labor costs per plant based on the information in the IAB 
establishment panel. Similarly, we derive a measure of competitiveness at the 
sectoral level by using OECD STAN data. Our analysis is closely linked to two recent 
studies by Davis and Harrigan (2011) and Harrigan and Reshef (2011), who extend 
the Melitz framework by modeling sorting into export according to productivity 
and labor costs, both drawn from a joint distribution. We regress the export share 
of German plants on our two measures of competitiveness. Since our endogenous 
variable is a fractional variable with a probability mass at zero it is not appropriate 
to model this variable by OLS or a variant of it. This issue is extensively discussed 
in Papke and Wooldridge (1996) and has been applied to international trade by 
Wagner (2001). These papers suggest using a fractional Logit/Probit model. On 
the other hand, the existence of a corner solution problem suggests the use of 
a Tobit model. We chose to follow both approaches and compare the results, 
which are remarkably similar. Irrespective of the choice of model, our results show 
a positive and significant relationship between plant-level competitiveness and 
export activity. Plants that are characterized by lower unit labor costs relative to 
their average foreign competitors export more. To the best of our knowledge, our 
paper provides the first plant-level evidence on the role of both productivity and 
average wages as export determinants. Moreover, we use Tobit regressions in the 
spirit of Felbermayr and Kohler (2006), which allow us to decompose the total 
effect into its component effects at the extensive and intensive margins of trade. 
The Tobit model has the crucial advantage that both effects can be estimated 
simultaneously. Of course, the Tobit model is appropriate only if we believe that 
the data generating process is the same at both margins. Put differently, we are 
postulating that the forces that drive firms’ exporting behavior at both margins 
are identical. Following this approach we are able to report robust evidence on the 
export-promoting effects of competitiveness at both margins. Our results show 
that an increase of plant-competitiveness by two standard deviations is associated 
with an approximately 4% higher probability of being an exporter at the extensive 
margin and a one percentage point higher export intensity at the intensive margin. 
The results are robust to different estimators. Our industry-level competitiveness 
is insignificant in all specifications and models. Measuring competitiveness in 
terms of low labor costs reveals a negative relationship. Low-wage firms tend to 
export less. This result is in line with a huge literature that demonstrates that 
exporters pay higher wages. Schank, Schnabel, and Wagner (2007) were the first 
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to use matched employer–employee data in order to show that the exporter wage 
premium is of the residual type. Controlling for observed and unobserved worker 
characteristics, ceteris paribus they find that German exporters in manufacturing 
industries pay higher wages than plants that solely serve the domestic market. Klein, 
Moser, and Urban (2010) further distinguish between low- and high-skilled workers 
and show that the positive premium is mainly driven by a premium paid to the 
high-skilled, whereas the low-skilled even suffer from a wage discount. Including 
both plant-level competitiveness measures reveals that ignoring the relative wage 
payments leads to lower point estimates of the competitiveness measures. We 
find a much stronger link between competitiveness and exports when controlling 
for the exporter wage premium through our labor cost competitiveness measure.
As an additional exercise, we separate regressions into the pre- and post- Euro 
era. Our results show that competitiveness was indeed important only after the 
Euro was introduced in the year 1999, which is in line with the critique by Lagarde 
and the accompanying hypothesis of wage moderation driving export activity. In 
this perspective, our paper can be related to a recent work by Hogrefe, Jung, and 
Kohler (2012), who argue that the introduction of the Euro gave rise to currency 
misalignments. In line with their study we find at least weak evidence for interaction 
between the introduction of a common currency union, competitiveness and trade.
Finally, random effects Tobit regressions are used as a robustness test. The findings 
further support the importance of wages in determining sorting into exporting. 
Competitiveness turns out to be insignificant, but the negative link between wage 
competitiveness and exports is not affected. However, higher plant competitiveness 
significantly increases exports at both margins when average wages are included in 
the regression.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes the 
data source and provides first descriptive evidence. Section 5.3 introduces the 
empirical strategy. The results are presented in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Data and first descriptives
The IAB establishment panel. Our main data source is the IAB establishment 
panel, which is a stratified annual sample that surveys about 16,000 German plants 
with at least one employee subject to social security contributions. We focus on 
manufacturing industries, where trade in goods is much more important compared 
to the service sector. East German plants were first surveyed in the 1996 wave so that 
we focus on the period 1996–2008.5
5 The panel comprises newer data that reach to the year, 2010 and it would be very interesting to exploit these, 
especially from the background of the financial and economic crisis. However, due to a structural break in the 
data, many of our control variables cannot be computed after 2008. Therefore, we decided to use the dataset 
only up to the year 2008.
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Within each wave we have information about the share of revenues generated 
through exports. Unfortunately, we have only very little information about the 
destination of exports. More precise information would allow us to run gravity-
like regressions at the plant level by taking distance into account.6 However, we 
argue that most German trade is within Europe, where distance is less important.7 
Beside export intensity there is a large set of additional information, such as 
establishment size, measured as the total number of employees, revenue, usage 
of intermediate inputs and investments. This dataset is based on the needs of the 
German Federal Employment Agency, so that in addition it comprises a large set of 
workforce characteristic controls. For instance, information about the recognition 
of a collective agreement, the share of female, part-time, short-term or qualified 
employees is available or can be constructed. See Felbermayr, Hauptmann, and 
Schmerer (2012a) for a detailed discussion on the data used. More comprehensive 
information on the IAB establishment can be found in Fischer, Janik, Müller, and 
Schmucker (2009) and Kölling (2000).
There is no capital information in the data. We apply the perpetual inventory 
method proposed by Müller (2008, 2010) as a proxy. Based on the information 
about the amount and type of expansion investments by plant we construct 
proxies for the plant’s capital stocks by summing over all periods. Type-specific 
depreciation rates are used as discount factors.
The industry-level data on labor costs, total value, and bilateral trade flows are 
taken from the STAN-database of the OECD.
First glimpse at the data. Figure 5.1 graphs the variables of interest over time. The 
left panel compares the share of exporters (extensive margin), the export intensity 
of exporting plants (intensive margin) and the average level of competitiveness 
in German manufacturing industries.8 The latter measures the competitiveness 
of Germany relative to its trading partners through production costs per unit 
of output.9 Hence, a lower index for competitiveness implies that Germany has 
a relative cost advantage compared to its trading partners. To make this more 
illustrative and intuitive we decided to use the inverse of the index so that a 
higher measure corresponds to higher competitiveness.
6 For some waves there is some limited information about export destinations. Schmillen (2011) shows how 
the broader information about two different areas can be used to construct distance proxies for the export 
destination for the IAB establishment panel. However, since it does not cover our whole sample period and 
consists of just three very broad regional categories, we do not utilize this measure.
7 The Federal Statistic Office of Germany reports that in 2012 almost 70% of exports of goods made in Germany 
were shipped to European countries. Asia and America rank second and third, far behind Europe.
8 All plant-level means are constructed using probability weights.
9 See the methodology section for more details on the construction of the index.
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Figure 5.1: The evolution of exports, competitiveness, and wages
This first glimpse at the data reveals that the export intensity of German 
manufacturers and the relative cost advantage increased over time, as displayed 
in the left panel. Except for a short but sharp dip in the share of exporting plants 
in 1998, and a brief period of decreasing export intensity of exporting plants 
(2000–2002), both the extensive and intensive margins have risen in the period 
under consideration. The end of the timeline indicates a downturn in exports 
that is due to the beginning of the economic and financial crisis that sparked 
off in 2008. Despite the downturn, the export activity at both margins is still 
about 10  percentage points higher than in 1996. Our measure of competitiveness 
indicates no clear cost advantage for Germany until 2000. From then on, we first 
observe a moderate increase in competitiveness between 2000 and 2003 before 
German plants managed to push up their relative cost advantage more significantly. 
Interestingly, the emerging crisis seems to dampen the competitiveness of German 
plants relative to their foreign rivals.
The right panel plots average wages over time. Without making the distinction 
between manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors, we find the well-
known picture that wage growth in Germany was stagnant after 2000, which 
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is often associated with “wage moderation”. If we focus on the manufacturing 
industries, which are characterized by their high degree of export participation, 
we find a considerable increase in wages since 1998. Therefore, the picture 
at least challenges the proposed nexus between wage moderation and export 
status. Moreover, it also provokes the question how rising wages and increasing 
competitiveness fit together. Two potential explanations consistent with these 
stylized facts are an increase in labor productivity and/or soaring labor costs of 
Germany’s trading partners.
5.3 Empirical strategy
Our empirical strategy is twofold. In a first step we construct various measures 
of competitiveness for Germany. We then regress the plant’s export intensity on 
the competitiveness measures. We try to put as many plant controls as possible 
in order to account for the omitted variable bias. Different estimators are used to 
address potential concerns about unobserved heterogeneity and to decompose the 
overall effect into its components at different margins.
Measuring plant competitiveness. We construct plant-level competitiveness 
measures that allow us to relate a plant’s unit labor costs to its international 
engagement through the variable
  (5.1)
where Vit/Wit measures plant i’s value added over its wage sum at time t. In this 
sense, our competitiveness measure mirrors the inverse of nominal unit labor 
costs. Higher competitiveness may be due to higher productivity and/or lower 
labor costs. Hence, we also shed light on the role of wages on unit labor costs 
as further plant-level evidence in order to assess the role of wage moderation 
on competitiveness by running all regressions including the average plant wage 
or/and the unit labor costs. Higher export intensity may be positively correlated 
with the average plant wage as long as unit labor costs are falling. Firms that 
become more productive can pay higher wages but still have relatively low unit 
labor costs. We expect a negative relationship between unit labor costs and plant 
exports. The effect of wages and exports may go in both directions.
Measuring industry-competitiveness. We use data from the OECD STAN database to 
construct a proxy for Germany’s international competitiveness at the industry level as
Cit = Vit/Wit,
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  (5.2)
where WDjt/VDjt denotes real unit labor costs in industry j at time t in Germany 
(indicated by subscript D) computed as labor cost (WDjt ) over value added (VDjt ). 
The denominator in (5.2) is a sum of unit labor costs of Germany’s trading partners, 
weighted by each partner’s trade share akjt .
10 Competitiveness increases if German 
unit labor costs increase (decrease) less (more) compared to its trading partners’ 
average unit labor costs. For the estimations we use the predetermined trade 
share from the 1995 wave for all waves. Thus, the weights are constant over all 
waves included in our study (1996–2008).
To estimate the export intensity and competitiveness nexus we run the 
following model
  (5.3)
where EXPit is the export share of plant i in year t. Cit denotes our plantlevel 
competitiveness measure, Cjt is the competitiveness of plant i’s industry j at time  t, 
and Xit is a vector of plant characteristics. Finally, εit represents a stochastic error 
term. We always include controls for year-specific fixed effects, θt, industry-
specific fixed effects, θj , and regional-specific fixed-effects, θr .
As suggested in Wagner (2001) and Wagner (2011), the preferred model is a 
fractional Probit/Logit estimator as proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996). 
Their major contribution was to establish an estimator that fits a distribution that 
accounts for the proportions 0 and 1.
Our sample contains both single- and multi-plant firms, which may cause 
problems with the export variable. It may well be that part of the production is 
indirectly exported through the firm rather than the plant. We tackle this issue by 
including only single-plant firms in the sample, which are the majority.
Exploring the intensive and extensive margins of German export success. 
Felbermayr and Kohler (2006) use a corner solutions approach in order to 
decompose the effect of distance on bilateral trade into its component effects at 
10 The weights are constructed such that akjt = Tkjt/
∑
k Tkjt , where Tkjt , denotes the trade between Germany 
and its partner country k in industry j. The weights therefore sum up to unity.
Cjt =
VDjt/WDjt∑
k akjtVkjt/Wkjt
,
EXPit = α + Citγ1 + Cjtγ2 +Xitβ + θj + θt + θr + εit,
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the intensive and extensive margins.11 They propose a Tobit regression approach 
which allows them to estimate both effects simultaneously. We employ the same 
estimator
The dependent variable takes the value zero with a certain probability p (EXP = 0|x). 
Certain values above zero, observations for exporters, happen with zero probability. 
Put differently, the export intensity is partly continuous over a certain interval. The 
model can be estimated using a consistent maximum likelihood estimator
  (5.4)
where i is an indicator variable that takes the value one if EXP > 0. The solution 
to the maximization problem yields the coefficients β with the following 
interpretation
  (5.5)
However, besides the partial derivatives on the ”latent” variable EXP* the non-
linear estimates obtained from the maximization of equation (5.4) can be used to 
compute the effects at the extensive and intensive margin through
  (5.6)
which can be predicted based upon the estimates obtained from solving 5.4.12 All 
marginal effects are evaluated at the sample means. The effects at the intensive 
margin can be interpreted as the marginal effect of variable x on the expected 
export intensity of firms that already export. The effect at the extensive margin is 
the change in probability of becoming an exporter if x changes.
11 Galiani (2008) provides a comprehensive overview over the corner solutions approach and its implementation 
into Stata.
12 We use the Stata commands mfx compute, predict(p(0,.)), mfx compute, predict(e(0,.)), mfx compute, 
predict(ys(0,.)) in order to predict the marginal effects in Equation (5.6). See Galiani (2008) for more information.
{
EXP ∗ = x′β + u,
EXP = max(0, EXP ∗).
L(β) =
n∏
i=1
[
P (EXPi = 0)
1−wif(EXPi|xi, EXPi > 0)wi
]
,
∂E(EXP ∗|x)
∂x
= β.
∂P (EXP > 0|x)
∂x︸ ︷︷ ︸
Extensive
,
∂E(EXP |x,EXP > 0)
∂x︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intensive
,
∂E(EXP |x)
∂x︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total
,
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The two-step approach: Probit. There is also a heated discussion about whether 
to use a two-step approach to estimate the sorting into export using a Probit 
model. Hence, we also rerun the empirical specification presented in Equation  (5.3) 
based on a Probit model. A plant’s export performance is measured by a dummy 
that takes the value one if the plant has a positive export share. However, the 
export intensity itself is not taken into account, so that the marginal effect of 
competitiveness gives us the change in the probability of being an exporter.
5.4 Results
Table 5.1 reports coefficients obtained from estimating (5.3), where both plant- 
and industry-level competitiveness are included. Plant-level competitiveness is 
included in logs in order to account for the non-linear relationship between unit 
labor costs and exports.13 Coefficients are reported in the first row of Table 5.1. 
Overall, we find that firms that are more competitive due to lower unit labor 
costs export more. However, the magnitude of the effect changes with different 
models and the level of significance varies systematically over different samples. 
All coefficients reported are marginal effects.
The role of unit labor costs. As a first step we distinguish between a Fractional Probit 
(column 1) and a Fractional Logit estimator (column 2). The coefficients measure 
the total effect of competitiveness on exports so that a further decomposition 
into the effects at the extensive and intensive margins is not possible based on 
the Fractional Probit/Logit model. The descriptives in the appendix show that the 
standard deviation of plant competitiveness is approximately 0.7. Exploiting this 
information helps us to evaluate the magnitude of the effects. Competitiveness 
is measured in logs so that the 0.7 standard deviation translates into a 70% 
standard deviation from the mean in both directions. A two-standard deviation 
increase in competitiveness is associated with a 1.12 to 0.98% higher export 
intensity, depending on whether we assume a Probit or Logit distribution, reported 
in columns (1) and (2) respectively.14
However, the results may be biased due to the presence of a corner solution 
problem that plagues our dependent variable. Zero export intensity is observed 
at a positive probability, whereas a certain export intensity above zero has zero 
mass in a continuous distribution. Linear models yield biased results, which can be 
addressed using a simple Tobit regression approach.
13 The standard deviation of plant competitiveness in logs is 0.7, the minimum is around -7.57 and the maximum 
is around 3.335.
14 We compute the effect as 140 × 0.007 = 0.98.
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The solution to the maximum likelihood function yields a one-step estimator for 
both the probability of being a corner solution (non-exporter) and the density 
of the export intensity conditional on our variables of interest. Co-efficients of 
the latent variable EXP*  (∂E (EXP*|x) / ∂x  =  β ) are omitted. The interpretation 
would be meaningless in our application.15 The McDonald and Moffitt (1980) 
decomposition allows to compute the marginal effects for different regions of 
the non-linear Tobit regression results. At the extensive margin, we are interested 
in the effects of competitiveness on the probability of being an exporter, 
∂P (EXP > 0|x)/ ∂x, reported in column (3) as Tobit I. Coefficients are evaluated at 
the mean of all other regressors. At the intensive margin, we are mainly interested 
in the effects of competitiveness on the export intensity of plants that already 
export, ∂E (EXP|x, EXP > 0) / ∂x, reported in column  (4) as Tobit II. Again, all 
marginal effects are evaluated at the sample means of all other regressors.
At the extensive margin we find that plants that increase their competitiveness 
relative to their “rival” by the same two standard deviations have a 4% higher 
probability of being an exporter. Conditional on already being an exporter, plants 
that increase their competitiveness by two standard deviations can increase 
their export intensity by one percentage point. The combined total effect at 
both margins (labeled TOBIT III) is reported in column (5). The same two standard 
deviation increase in plant-competitiveness is associated with an increase in 
exports of roughly 1.26 percentage points. This last coefficient is the counterpart 
to the coefficient reported in columns (1) and (2), where we used the Fractional 
Probit/Logit estimator to estimate the total effect of competitiveness on exports. 
It turns out that both the fractional models and the Tobit model yield results that 
are remarkably close to each other with coefficients between 0.008 and 0.01. 
Given the huge standard deviation of competitiveness, the difference between the 
coefficients is not significant.
The two-step Probit model results are reported in column (6). We basically 
obtain the same results as for the extensive margin results based on the Tobit 
regression which is reported in column (3). However, we still don’t know whether 
this relationship is driven by wages or productivity. The effect is difficult to 
separate but we tackle this issue by comparing the effects with regression results 
that include additional wage measures.
15 Plants that report zero trade are non-exporters so that there is no latent trade variable as it is the case in the 
famous textbook example on expenditure and consumption.
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The role of wages in determining competitiveness. As a second step, we analyze 
the role of wages for exports in Germany. Higher wages may reduce competitiveness 
through higher production costs. On the other hand, higher wages may be one of 
the crucial determinants of high quality. Both arguments have opposing effects on 
competitiveness but equally explain the observable surge in exports observed in 
Germany. We therefore analyze the role of wages and competitiveness separately 
by first including only the inverse average wage measure (Table 5.2) before we 
include both the wage and the unit labor costs variable into the same regression. 
The latter results are reported in Table 5.3. Note that we focus on the inverse wage 
rate, so that higher wages are associated with lower wage competitiveness. We 
compare the same models as before.
There is already a large literature on the exporter wage premium that states 
that exporting firms pay higher wages, which would be consistent with a 
negative sign of the competitiveness measure. The hypothesized wage moderation 
to export promotion effect would be validated by a positive sign of the wage 
competitiveness measure.
However, despite the higher labor costs, exporting firms may still be more 
efficient through their higher productivity. Our results confirm the hypothesized 
negative relationship. The export promoting effect of competitiveness reported 
in Table 5.1 hardly stems from the firms’ low wage payments. On average, higher 
wages are associated with more intensified trade at both margins.
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Dividing the sample into a pre- and a post-Euro era. Tables 5.4–5.6 report the 
results obtained from the post-Euro sample that starts from 1996 (the earliest 
wave that covers all regions in Germany) and 1999, the year the exchange rates 
were officially fixed within the Euro area. Again, we compare fractional Probit, 
Tobit and Probit models. Except for the Tobit model results, competitiveness is 
insignificant before the year the common currency was introduced in 1999. We 
compare these results to the estimates obtained from regressions based on the 
post-Euro sample, which are reported in Tables 5.5 and 5.6, where we divide the 
post-Euro sample into a pre- and post-Hartz 4 sample. The advantage of dividing 
the post-Euro period into two sub-periods is that the different samples are roughly 
comparable in time length. However, the results have to be treated cautiously, at 
least for the Tobit estimators. There is a discussion that nonlinear estimators yield 
results that are not comparable across different samples. Nevertheless, we are 
mainly interested in the inference of statistical significance. The magnitude of the 
effects can be compared based on the outcomes of the linear models. We obtain 
significant estimates for the period after the Euro was introduced.
Estimates for the period 2005–2008 are significant only for the Tobit model. 
Competitiveness is insignificant for the Probit model. For Fractional-Probit/Logit 
we obtain coefficients that are significant only at the 10 and 5% level. This 
supports the hypothesized link between the establishment of a common currency 
union and competitiveness.
The random effects Tobit model. Including factor variables when estimating 
Tobit regressions is not appropriate due to the nonlinearity of the Tobit model. 
We therefore use a random-effects estimator in order to purge the regressions 
from unobserved heterogeneity at the plant level. Table 5.7 reports the results. The 
coefficient indicates a rather low relationship between unit labor costs and exports 
once we control for the random effects. Moreover, the unit labor costs measure is 
insignificant in columns (1) to (3). Thus, the exporting promoting effects seem to 
be driven by some unobservable factors omitted in the regressions above. Columns 
(4) to (6) report regression results where only wage competitiveness is included. 
Again, we find a significant relationship between higher wages and higher 
exports. Most interestingly, columns (7) to (9) report regression results where we 
include both plant-competitiveness measures. Finally, plant-competitiveness is 
significantly associated with exports at both margins.
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5.5 Conclusion
Our paper contributes to the discussion of potential explanations for Germany’s 
recent export success. We are able to show that higher plant-level competitiveness 
due to higher productivity and/or lower wages is positively correlated with export 
intensity at the intensive and extensive margins. Moreover, this effect is not driven 
by lower wage payments, as exports are associated with higher wages. There are 
two explanations: Firms are more efficient in producing goods, or real exchange 
rate movements in the Euro area led to higher export demand for relatively 
cheaper German products. The latter affects all industries equally. Moreover, both 
arguments are consistent with the higher wage payments in exporting plants. Our 
regressions support this latter view in so far that separate regressions for the pre- 
and post-Euro periods reveal that the export promoting effect of competitiveness 
is strongest shortly after the Euro was introduced. Some of the models yield 
insignificant coefficients of competitiveness before 1999 or after 2004. Future 
research has to be done in quantifying the effects at work based on a structural 
estimation of a macro-economic model. However, this is beyond the scope of our 
paper.
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5.A IAB establishment panel
Table 5.A.1: Description of variables and summary statistics
Variable Description Mean S.D.
Exports (share) Share of sales abroad relative to total sales. 0.137 0.224
Plant-comp. (ln) Plant-level competitiveness in logs, measured 
as inverse unit labor cost, as defined in (5.1).
0.630 0.704
Plant-comp. wage (ln) Plant-level wage competitiveness in logs, 
measured as inverse average wages. Average 
wages are calculated as total wage sum over 
total employment.
-7.367 0.527
Industry-comp. Industry-level competitiveness index, measured 
as inverse unit labor cost relative to inverse 
unit labor cost of trading partners as defined in 
(5.2). Data source: OECD STAN data base.
0.875 0.095
Employment (ln) Total employment in logs. 3.509 1.566
Capital (ln) Capital in logs. Capital is proxied by applying 
the perpetual inventory method by Müller 
(2008, 2010).
13.744 2.314
Female workers (share) Number female employees relative to total 
number of employees.
0.280 0.227
Part-time workers (share) Number employees with part-time contracts 
relative to total number of employees.
0.099 0.148
Short-term workers (share) Number of employees with short-term 
contracts relative to total number of employees.
0.030 0.076
Apprentices (share) Number of apprentices relative to total number 
of employees.
0.056 0.080
Qualified tasks (share) Number of workers with qualified tasks relative 
to total number of employees. Qualified tasks 
are defined as requiring either a completed 
apprenticeship or a university degree.
0.670 0.244
Multi-empl. barg. (dummy) 1 if establishment is subject to multi-employer 
collective agreements (Flächentarifvertrag ).  
0 if not subject to collective agreements.
0.360 0.480
Single-empl. barg. 
(dummy)
1 if establishment is subject to single-employer 
collective agreements (Firmentarifvertrag).  
0 if not subject to collective agreements.
0.086 0.280
Workers council (dummy) 1 if workers council is present, 0 otherwise. 0.324 0.468
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(continued)
Variable Description Mean S.D.
West Germany (dummy) 1 if establishment is located in West Germany. 
0  if otherwise.
0.456 0.498
Foreign ownership 
(dummy)
1 if establishment is mainly property of a 
foreign owner, 0 if establishment is mainly 
property of domestic owners.
0.047 0.213
Ownership n.a. (dummy) 1 if establishment majority ownership is not 
known or missing. 0 if otherwise.
0.085 0.279
Capital company (dummy) 1 if establishment’s legal form is a limited 
liability company or a company limited by 
shares, 0 if otherwise.
0.679 0.467
Founded before 1990 
(dummy)
1 if establishment is founded before 1990,  
0 if founded 1990 or later.
0.576 0.494
Source: IAB establishment panel, 1996–2008. 4,683 establishments, 18,620 observations.
Chapter 6 
Concluding remarks

139Chapter 6
Concluding remarks
The aim of this thesis is to study wage formation processes in the context of 
globalization and different institutional settings. In particular, three research 
questions are formulated to address different aspects on that topic: First, 
how does collective bargaining coverage evolve in modern economies if firms 
are free to opt for alternative modes of wage-setting? Second, how does the 
increasing international exposure of firms affect wages in the context of different 
institutional settings? Third, how do wages and competitiveness affect the export 
participation of firms?
Chapter 2 addresses the first question by modeling the evolution of collective 
bargaining coverage rates. In contrast to the existing literature, firms are 
allowed to decide about joining the collective bargaining regime. This approach 
is consistent with the system of industrial relations in many European countries 
and challenges the view, that firms are generally opposed to collective wage 
bargaining. Beyond wages, regimes differ in their cost structures. The results show 
that these differences are sufficient to describe incomplete collective bargaining 
coverage with endogenous selection as a stable equilibrium outcome. Furthermore, 
the results are in line with the related literature emphasizing the role of technical 
progress and product market deregulations.
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 investigate the second research question by studying the 
exporter wage premium of firms subject to collective agreements. Both chapters 
are based on recent theoretical findings. In particular, Chapter 3 investigates 
empirically, whether wages in exporting firms are systematically different if they 
are subject to collective agreements. Several theoretical contributions in the current 
literature predict a lower exporter wage premium if firms are subject to collective 
agreements due to stronger competition on foreign markets. The results indeed 
show that rent-sharing is less pronounced in firms with more export exposure.
Chapter 4 supplements the literature on the exporter wage premium by using 
differences in payments above the binding wage floor in firms subject to 
collective agreements. The empirical identification of the exporter wage premium 
is commonly based on the within variation of the data. This raises concerns if 
the variation over time is low. Chapter 4 offers a new identification strategy of 
the exporter fair wage premium. Collective wage agreements constitute a legally 
binding wage floor. Nevertheless, firms are allowed to pay more if they choose so. 
We use this above wage floor payments to proxy for fair wage considerations. The 
results show that the firm’s export intensity is associated with these payments, 
supporting the fair-wage hypothesis.
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Chapter 5 addresses the third question, i.e. the link between wages, competitiveness 
and the international participation of firms. In particular, the chapter contributes 
to the expanding literature on the German export success during the last years. 
The results confirm that higher competitiveness of firms due to higher productivity 
or lower wages increases the export intensity of firms. Nevertheless, lower wage 
payments alone are not associated with more export participation which is 
consistent with the literature on the exporter wage premium.
This thesis addresses the process of wage formation from different perspectives. 
The results show that wages, globalization and institutions are highly interconnected. 
These processes are central to answer some of the big questions. I cannot give one 
clear cut answer, but I hope I have added some smaller ones. It is of course just 
one step towards a more general understanding of how wages are set in modern 
economies. But I think it is a challenging and rewarding field of research.
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Abstract
Wage formation processes form an important element in many economic and 
social discussions, especially in the context of increasing globalization during the 
past decades. Against this background, this dissertation addresses different aspects 
of wage formation in modern economies. It consists of four independent essays. 
Chapter 2 investigates why some firms pay collectively agreed wages rather than 
to negotiate wages individually. The analysis is carried out in a theoretical general 
equilibrium framework with endogenous self-selection of firms into two different 
wage regimes. The results show that different cost structures are sufficient 
to explain incomplete collective agreement coverage rates as an equilibrium 
outcome. Furthermore, the results show that the decrease in collective bargaining 
coverage rates can be attributed to technological progress and product market 
deregulations. Chapter 3 studies wage formation in international firms. Based on 
recent theoretical considerations, the chapter investigates empirically whether 
international trade exposure reduces the so called exporter wage premium in 
firms subject to collective agreements. The results show that rent-sharing is less 
pronounced in more export-intensive firms or in more open industries. Chapter 4 
provides new empirical evidence on the fair-wage hypothesis in exporting firms. 
Among other things, fair-wage considerations depend also on whether the firm 
is able to pay certain wage rates. In the German system of industrial relations, 
the collectively agreed wage constitutes a binding wage floor, but employers 
are allowed to pay higher wage rates. We employ this setting to investigate 
the implications of the fair-wage-hypothesis. In contrast to previous literature, 
identification does not rely on the within variation of the data. The results show 
that payments above the collectively agreed wage floor are systematically related 
to the firm’s export intensity. Chapter 5 studies also empirically the determinants 
of a firm’s export participation. The findings indicate that higher plant-level 
competitiveness, measured by lower unit labor costs, is positively associated with 
the firm’s export participation.
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Kurzfassung
Lohnbildungsprozesse bilden einen wichtigen Bestandteil in vielen ökonomischen 
und gesellschaftlichen Debatten, besonders im Kontext der zunehmenden Globa-
lisierung während der vergangenen Dekaden. Vor diesem Hintergrund adressiert 
diese Dissertation unterschiedliche Aspekte der Lohnbildung in modernen Volks-
wirtschaften. Sie besteht aus vier voneinander unabhängigen Aufsätzen. Kapitel 2 
untersucht, warum einige Firmen nach Tarif zahlen, statt die Löhne individuell aus-
zuhandeln. Die Analyse wird in einem theoretischen allgemeinen Gleichgewichts-
modell mit endogener Lohnregimeselektion durchgeführt, wobei Firmen sich in ei-
nes von zwei Lohn regimen selektieren. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass unterschiedliche 
Kostenstrukturen ausreichend sind, um unvollständige Tarifvertragsabdeckung im 
Gleichgewicht zu erklären. Darüber hinaus zeigen die Ergebnisse, dass der Rück-
gang der Tarif bindung durch technischen Fortschritt und Produktmarktderegulie-
rungen erklärt werden kann. Kapitel 3 betrachtet die Lohnbildung in internatio-
nalen Firmen. Basierend auf den jüngsten theoretischen Überlegungen untersucht 
dieses Kapitel empirisch, ob Außenhandelsaktivitäten von Firmen die sogenannte 
Exportlohn prämie reduziert, wenn sie gleichzeitig an Tarifverträge gebunden sind. 
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Aufteilung von ökonomischen Renten – in export-
intensiven Firmen oder offeneren Sektoren weniger ausgeprägt ist. Kapitel 4 liefert 
neue empirische Belege zur sogenannten „Fair-Wage-Hypothese“ in exportierenden 
Unternehmen. Angemessene Lohnzahlungen hängen, unter anderem, von der Leis-
tungsfähigkeit der Firma ab. In Deutschland stellt der Tariflohn eine verbindliche 
Lohnuntergrenze dar, von der der Arbeitgeber allerdings nach oben abweichen kann. 
Wir verwenden dies, um die Implikationen der „Fair-Wage-Hypothese“ zu unter-
suchen. Im Gegensatz zu bisherigen Ansätzen basiert die Identifikationsstrategie 
nicht auf der Variabilität der Daten über die Zeit. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Zah-
lungen oberhalb des geltenden Tariflohns systematisch mit der Exportintensität der 
Firma assoziiert sind. Kapitel  5 untersucht, ebenfalls empirisch, die Determinanten 
der Exportpartizipation einer Firma. Es zeigt sich, dass eine höhere Wettbewerbs-
fähigkeit, gemessen durch geringere Lohnstückkosten, positiv mit der Exportaktivi-
täten einer Firma korreliert ist.
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Why do some firms pay collectively agreed wages rather than to 
negotiate wages individually? Do exporting firms pay higher wages 
than non-exporting firms, and to what extent this is determined by 
institutional frameworks? What are the connections between the labor 
unit costs and a strong export performance of companies? These and 
other questions are addressed in this book by Andreas Hauptmann. 
In several chapters the author shows a variety of interactions between 
wages, globalization and institutional factors.
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